Options for a Sustainable Europe. Policy Recommendations from the General Consultative Forum on the Environment by unknown
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
OPTIONS FOR A SUSTAINABLE 
EUROPE 
Policy recommendations from the General Consultative Forum 
on the Environment 

• * • 
• • 
• • 
• • 
European Commission 
Directorate-General for Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil Protection 
OPTIONS FOR A SUSTAINABLE 
EUROPE 
Policy recommendations from the General Consultative Forum 
on the Environment 
A great deal of additional information on the European Union is available on the Internet. 
It can be accessed through the Europa server (http://europa.eu.int) 
Cataloguing data can be found at the end of this publication 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1997 
ISBN 92-828-1464-5 
© European Communities, 1997 
Reproduction is authorized provided the source is acknowledged 
Printed in Italy 
Preface 
Over the three years of the Forum's existence, the process and output of the 
'Scenarios for a sustainable Europe in the year 2020' exercise culminated its 
biggest, and perhaps most influential, achievement. Why did the Forum choose to 
use scenarios? Given the immense complexity of environmental and social 
sustainability issues in Europe, scenarios offer useful tools to help model key 
considerations and assumptions, and to identify gaps, inconsistencies and dilem-
mas. A richer understanding may result, leading to a clearer understanding of what 
sort of action needs to be taken to move away from the status quo. The Forum 
dedicated its last plenary meeting in November 1996 to discussing the scenarios 
document and arrived at seven fundamental recommendations for the Commis-
sion. In a letter to the Commission, they stressed that these recommendations are 
'of great importance for the Commission to consider as the European Union 
moves towards the 21st century ... (and) ... as it prepares its future policies and in 
preparation of any new sustainable development programmes'. 
The Forum set five objectives for the scenarios project: 
1. to test and provoke the Forum's thinking about sustainability; 
2. to help the European Commission develop its own vision for a sustainable 
Europe in the year 2020; 
3. to challenge policy-makers to develop a more future-oriented approach to 
environmental policy; 
4. to contribute to the definition of the agenda of the next Forum; 
5. to communicate to a wider audience the complexity and inter-dependencies 
involved in achieving a sustainable Europe, and provoke further thought on 
new ways of proceeding. 
Publishing and distributing the scenarios goes towards fulfil l ing the fifth and 
perhaps the most ambitious of the above objectives. 
Structure of the document 
This volume consists of two texts. The first is the summary and recommendations 
agreed on by the Forum in November 1996 on how the Commission should 
approach its policy-making in the light of the environment and sustainable 
development in the run-up to the year 2000. The second text, prepared by the 
International Institute for Environment and Development and by SustainAbility in 
the United Kingdom, is a much longer one describing a series of scenarios for a 
sustainable Europe in the year 2020. It has not been agreed by the Forum but 
served as a brainstorming tool, outlining the key issues and setting the scene for 
the Forum's discussions before it agreed on the summary and recommendations. 
Those scenarios can be summarized as follows: 
1. Opening opportunities: the driving concern is Europe's ability to compete in 
the global market and create jobs, and the leading response is a focus on 
liberalization and market driven technological innovation as a way to safe-
guard economic progress, and thereby afford environmental and social 
improvement; 
2. Guiding change: the driving concern is growing social and economic security, 
and the leading response is new policies to provide the appropriate signals to 
economic actors and to deliver a balance of cohesive social, environmental 
and economic outcomes; 
3. Transforming communities: the driving concern is the inability of current 
policies to get to the root of social and environmental decline, and the 
response is a reform of priorities to favour qualitative development over 
quantitative growth. The choice is for stronger communities, high goals of 
human development, and simple, less stressful lifestyles. 
The seven recommendations are far-reaching in terms of content and time-frames 
as they look at the horizon of the 21st century. They stress the following: 
1. the EU should set up a 'sustainability' task force to develop new and innovative 
solutions for environment, economic and social cohesion; 
2. the EU should produce and publish widely a regular 'Sustainable develop-
ment' report; 
3. to ensure that the long term is taken account of in policy development, a think-
tank or 'House of the future' should be set up to develop innovative proposals 
for transparency, access to information, long-term investments in sustainable 
development and proper science to underpin long-term policy development; 
4. steps should be taken to raise awareness and improve communications on 
sustainability and more sustainable lifestyles in order to create more political 
support; 
5. European research and technological development strategies should focus on 
how to move towards sustainable development; 
6. in view of the global dimensions of sustainable development, the EU should 
prepare a strategy on its global and international role in sustainable develop-
ment as part of its foreign policy considerations; 
7. the EU should ensure that the role of local communities should be strength-
ened, as they are central to the transition of European society to sustainable 
development. 
Ritt Bjerregaard 
Member of the Commission 
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Introduction 
As part of the process of implementing the fifth action programme on the 
environment 'Towards sustainability', a General Consultative Forum was set up in 
1993 to advise the Commission on key strategic issues relating to environmental 
policy and sustainable development. Its term of office was three years. The 
fundamental characteristic of the Forum that gave its contribution to Commission 
thinking such high added value was its composition. Consisting of 32 members 
appointed on a personal basis by the Commission it was made up of eminent 
personalities from European industry, the business world, regional and local 
authorities, professional associations, unions, and environment protection and 
consumer organizations. It thus embodied the principle of shared responsibility 
that lies at the heart of the fifth action programme. The Forum succeeded in 
generating and enhancing existing and new views of the way sustainable 
development can be achieved in the Union and fulfilled the Commission's hope 
that it would become a channel of communication whereby Forum members 
passed the views developed in the meetings to the sectors concerned. The Forum 
also played an important role in integrating the concept of sustainable develop-
ment into the Commission's other policies, most notably in the fields of 
agriculture, transport, energy, and information and communication. In its own 
words, the Forum believes that it 'can provide the Commission with challenging 
and new ideas on developing and implementing sustainable development...'. 
The Forum met nine times throughout the 1993-96 period in full plenary sessions 
(uniting all 32 members) and many more times in smaller working groups (where 
most of the preparation of discussion papers took place). In 1996, the Forum 
reached agreement on 'Recommendations for moving towards a sustainable 
Europe in the year 2020', one of their papers which was sent to the Commission 
and has served as an important input into the Commission's policy thinking on all 
aspects relating to sustainable development. 
This publication wil l be distributed widely and it is hoped to encourage a 
wide-ranging debate on, and further implementation of, sustainable development 
policies across Europe. 

PART I 
Summary and recommendations 

1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Introduction to the 
scenarios for a sustainable 
Europe 
The Forum found these scenarios to be a useful tool 
to support their policy discussions, and recom-
mends the use of the scenarios to other groups in 
government, business and society that are seeking to 
develop policies for sustainable development. 
2. CONCERNS/VALUES 
At its plenary session in November 1996 the Forum, 
a body set up to advise the European Commission, 
considered potential scenarios for a sustainable 
Europe in the year 2020 and agreed on a series of 
recommendations to the European Commission on 
how it should approach its policy-making in the 
light of the environment and sustainable develop-
ment (SD) in the run-up to 2000. It set five objec-
tives for its work: 
• To test and provoke the Forum's thinking about 
sustainability, building on its work so far; 
• To help the European Commission develop its 
own 2020 vision for a sustainable Europe; 
• To challenge policy-makers and the various stake-
holders in sustainable development to develop a 
more future-oriented approach to environmental 
policy; 
• To contribute to the definition of the agenda for 
the next Forum (1997-99); 
• To communicate to a wider audience the com-
plexity and interdependencies involved in 
achieving a sustainable Europe, and provoke fur-
ther thought on new ways of proceeding. 
To identify its recommendations, the Forum con-
sidered three scenarios for a sustainable Europe 
specially prepared for it. The scenarios were sup-
ported by and based on a background analysis of 
environmental, social and economic trends in 
Europe and the world (this document is attached 
in the third part). The Forum emphasized, how-
ever, that this should not be taken to mean that 
there was consensus on the content of the back-
ground document. 
Although the Scenarios for a sustainable Europe 
cover a broad range of environmental, economic 
and social issues at a broad level, it is clearly not 
possible for them to cover all possible issues in 
fine detail. This would not necessarily be desirable 
in any case, since the aim is for people to use the 
scenarios to explore implications and to try and 
answer such questions themselves, rather than for 
the scenarios to try to provide a complete set of 
answers. Similarly, the scenarios do not try to 
recommend which policies and actions are re-
quired to attain a given future, but instead they 
raise some of the key issues that policy-makers 
must face. 
On the basis of the scenarios, the following were 
identified as the key values and concerns that 
should guide the shaping of sustainable develop-
ment policies in Europe over the next 25 years: 
• Employment and competitiveness; 
• Environment and health; 
• Social security, social cohesion and equity; 
• Cultural diversity; 
• Personal freedom and democracy. 
3. ENVIRONMENT AND 
SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
PRIORITIES 
From the Forum's use of the scenarios, six issues 
emerged as the main areas of tension and balance 
in the area of environment and sustainable devel-
opment (SD) to be addressed by policy-makers 
over the next 25 years. These are key issues in the 
sense that environmental progress and sustainabil-
ity wil l only be attained if they are addressed. The 
issues were derived from an analysis of all three 
scenarios, and they are relevant to all three sce-
narios. In each case, the word 'environment' is 
not mentioned explicitly in the title, since it is 
understood that all issues refer to the environment. 
3.1. A new economic 
approach 
The Forum was concerned with the tension between 
attaining full employment, the need to ensure com-
petitiveness, protecting the environment and im-
proving quality of life taking into account the need 
for equity and the need to accommodate different 
lifestyles. It was also concerned about the impacts of 
the rich-poor divide and the possibility of develop-
ing new forms of employment and organization of 
time (work-sharing, increased leisure, etc.). The 
Forum identified the following additional issues 
related to economic policy: 
• What indicators are required to go beyond GNP 
and measure progress towards SD? (both supple-
mentary to and integrated with more traditional 
economic indicators); 
• What is the role of economic instruments? (taxes, 
incentives, etc.); 
• What are the institutional issues (e.g. the role of 
the EU and its members, and their relationship); 
• Can the EU go 'beyond GNP' on its own, or does 
it need a global approach? What are the harmo-
nization issues? 
Additional issues include job-sharing; promoting 
new kinds of economic activity and employment 
(beyond the discussion within the Delors White 
Paper); accelerating the exploitation of R&D in job 
creation; the move from production to services; the 
role of micro-enterprise; the implications of IT and 
teleworking; and the special concerns of rural areas, 
especially in southern Europe. 
3.2. Governance and 
democracy 
The Forum was concerned with a dual agenda of 
where decisions should be best taken (subsidiarity 
at global, regional, national and local levels) and 
how they should be taken to increase participation 
(to fill the democratic deficit). It also includes the 
balance between rights and responsibilities for all 
stakeholders. In considering the issues associated 
with different levels of decision-making, it is also 
necessary to differentiate between different re-
gions, both within Europe and in the rest of the 
world. 
3.3. Long-term policy 
and flexibility 
The Forum was concerned with the areas in 
which there is a need for long-term policy, and 
how to inspire the long-term thinking needed for 
SD while developing the necessary flexibility to 
respond to accelerating change and the possibility 
of surprise. This issue has both economic and 
political aspects: 
• A more appropriate balance must be struck 
between long-term and short-term interests and 
interest groups in the policy process. This wil l 
require institutional structures to explicitly con-
sider the long-term implications of policy; 
There are political problems associated with tak-
ing action in the short term to support or work 
towards long-term goals. There is a need for 
raising public awareness and support, which may 
also be a new role for NGOs (non-governmental 
organizations). 
3.4. Education, information 
and awareness-raising 
The Forum was concerned with tackling the appar-
ent gap between increasing amounts of technical 
information on SD and the everyday decision-mak-
ing requirements of consumers and business. It is 
also concerned with raising awareness and chang-
ing attitudes regarding SD. This will involve a 
re-thinking of policies for information, awareness, 
education and culture. Other aspects of this issue 
include: 
• Disparity between the scale of the SD challenge 
compared to the small sums being spent on 
public education and awareness-raising; 
• Appropriate balance between disseminating in-
formation and promoting 'learning by doing'; 
• Development of appropriate incentives (people 
will not act unless there are incentives); 
• Role of the local community as 'enabler' and 
catalyst in sharing and promoting best practice; 
• Developing a sense of 'European space' that 
transcends perceptions limited by national 
boundaries; 
• The short-term focus of mainstream media; 
• The need to integrate environmental messages 
into communication and advertising. 
3.5. The international role 
of the EU 
The Forum addressed the international role of the 
European Union in SD, which involves identifying 
Europe's SD interests and how it can project its 
SD values on the world stage. It involves issues of 
equity, trade, aid, technology transfer and invest-
ment, and identifying a strategic SD agenda with 
countries and regions such as Africa, China, India, 
Russia, the Mediterranean and Latin America. 
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3.6. R&D, innovation 
and technology 
The Forum was concerned with the tension between 
the need to innovate for greater eco-efficiency and 
the risks to humans and environment posed by 
technologies such as biotechnology and toxic 
chemicals. It also includes the integration and 
awareness of the role of information technology as a 
lever for SD in such areas as resource management 
and new sustainable lifestyles. Other aspects of this 
issue include: 
• How to accelerate the development, testing and 
adoption of eco-efficient technologies. Money is 
an important part of it, but not the only consid-
eration; 
• Social aspects of innovation and new technol-
ogies; 
• Developing new mechanisms to understand and 
communicate risks (e.g. chemical risks); 
• Creating the right investment climate in the EL) 
and areas receiving EU support; 
• Use of information technology as lever/amplifier 
to promote sustainable technological change; 
• Improving the balance between basic, applied 
and theoretical research; 
• Ensuring that the research community plays a 
more active role as a stakeholder in the SD 
debate; 
.· Fostering truly pan-European R&D; 
• R&D aiming at optimum eco-efficiency improve-
ments (e.g. new vehicles, solar energy); 
• Ensuring that life-cycle analysis (LCA)-style think-
ing is the basis for all R&D. 
4. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Recommendation No 1: 
Sustainability task force 
The European Commission should set up a task 
force for new and innovative solutions for environ-
ment, economic and social cohesion, which should 
focus on: 
• developing a vision for sustainable development 
in Europe; 
• more analysis and holistic linkages between dif-
ferent policy areas; ^ 
• more.sophisticated and precise policy options; 
• R&D policy to focus on accelerated use and 
exploitation of R&D (i.e. for faster job creation); 
• establishing the main SD indicators; 
• mechanisms to include non-monetary indicators 
in decision-making; 
• development of new employment possibilities 
through SD and the environment. 
This would give the EU the possibility to lead global 
developments by example. 
Recommendation No 2: 
Regular EU SD report 
In the light of Recommendation No 1, the EU should 
produce and publish widely a regular SD report, to 
include: 
• both 'performance' and 'balance sheet' informa-
tion; 
• integrated environmental/economic/social issues 
and aspects based on all the concerns/values and 
priorities identified by the Forum in the scenarios' 
work, and including employment and questions 
of regional distribution; 
• how trade-offs were reached between economic/ 
social/environmental issues, equity issues and 
assessment of long-term perspective and flexibil-
ity of policies; 
• policy evaluation of current policies (e.g. their 
cost-effectiveness) and also report on new poli-
cies in the pipeline; 
• SD assessment of EU public spending (and also 
aid and technology transfer); 
• progress on EU's global obligations (environment, 
trade, etc.); 
• international impact of the EU — i.e. how activ-
ities within the EU have economic, environmen-
tal and social impacts beyond the EU. 
In preparing the report, it wil l be necessary to attend 
to institutional and organizational aspects. For ex-
ample, each DG should contribute to the report 
(which would require greater cooperation within 
the Commission). It may be appropriate for the 
European Environment Agency to be involved in the 
preparation of the report. 
The report should be transparent and should also 
emphasize communications and participation. The 
report should also not be seen as the 'end' of a 
process, but rather as the input to a new cycle of 
policy development, and thus as an essential stage 
in the policy life cycle. 
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Recommendation No 3: 
Think-tank on 'House of the future' 
To ensure that the long term is taken account of in 
policy, a think-tank should be set up to develop 
innovative proposals for: 
• A political institution called for example the 
'House of the future' which would seek explicitly 
to take into consideration the concerns and pri-
orities of the longer term and the future in the 
development of policies; 
• SD constitutions at the EU and national level; 
• Transparency, access to information and appro-
priate communications; 
• Long-term investments for SD (which may not 
appear cost-effective over the shorter term); 
• Proper science to underpin long-term policy de-
velopment (which could include independent 
funding for scientific research); 
• Integrating SD and long-term perspectives into 
international institutions (notably the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), but also the United Na-
tions). 
Recommendation No 4: Awareness, 
communications and lifestyles 
Steps should be taken to raise awareness and 
improve communications on sustainability and 
more sustainable lifestyles, with citizens and busi-
nesses. Mechanisms that should be employed 
include: 
• Raise awareness of best practice on SD: There 
should be greater knowledge, awareness and 
communications of best practice on SD within the 
EU (similar to the way in which the PCSD in the 
US has collected best practice examples from 
across the US). Such information could be posted 
on a WWW site. 
• Communications on SD: The Commission should 
develop a communications strategy, starting by 
'speaking with one voice' within the Commis-
sion, and then spreading the message externally 
using mass media. The EU should also make use 
of public relations and advertising skills that are 
available in stakeholder groups to develop more 
effective communications strategies. Communi-
cations should take advantage not only of existing 
networks, but also new ones like the World-Wide 
Web (WWW) and Internet. 
• Competitions on SD should be set up. Compe-
titions are a good way of communicating best 
practice, innovations, etc. The competitions 
could be based on existing 'twinning' of cities 
in different EU countries and on exchanges of 
young people across EU. Adequate budgets are 
essential, since existing competitions are poorly 
funded, so they have a limited reach across the 
EU. 
In order to create political support for SD 
policies, a policy advisory group should be 
created of those groups and individuals that 
would be potential 'winners' as a result of SD 
policies, since they are typically dispersed or 
unaware of this. 
Recommendation No 5: 
Research and technology 
Steps should be taken to develop a European R&D 
strategy to move towards SD. This should include: 
• Developing more responsive university pro-
grammes to get away from the strong disciplinary 
tradition, facilitate problem-oriented research and 
interdisciplinary cooperation, and to encourage 
researchers to spend more time in the 'real' world 
away from their research environment; 
• Develop an R&D strategy for an eco-efficient 
Europe by 2020, complete with vision, dead-
lines and budget (similar in scale and ambition 
to the US plan to put a man on the moon in the 
1960s); 
• In order to promote the development, dissemi-
nation and use of new technologies, SD needs 
a market pull, for example through sustainable 
lifestyles and purchasing policies. Mechanisms 
should be put in place to provide such incen-
tives; 
• In order .to foster greater participation by citizens 
and stakeholders in R&D there should be provi-
sions to go beyond simply informing them, and to 
include them more closely in decisions about 
knowledge-creation. 
Recommendation No 6: Global and 
international role of the EU 
Sustainable development is a global issue, and 
cannot be attained solely within the ËU or by the EU 
acting alone. The EU should therefore prepare a 
strategy on its global and international role in SD, 
including: 
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Develop a policy paper on EU foreign policy and 
SD issues, evaluating how the EU could demon-
strate global leadership on SD; 
Develop regional specific policies. For example, 
irirrelation to the OECD countries the EU could 
compete on high environmental standards; with 
emerging economies the focus could be on life-
styles as well as technological exchange; and, 
with the poorest countries, there should be a 
focus on urgent environmental issues (e.g. water 
quality rather than climate change). There should 
also be SD screening of private and public finan-
cial flows to these countries; 
Attention should be paid to the potential role of 
private and public financial flows to facilitate the 
process of SD. 
Recommendation No 7: Strengthening 
the role of local communities 
Local communities can play an important role in the 
transition towards sustainability, and their role 
should be strengthened through: 
• Supporting stakeholder involvement in decision-
making: There should be technical and logisti-
cal support for greater access of local stakehold-
ers, consumers, SMEs (small and medium-sized 
enterprises) in European and global decision-
making; 
• Setting up local hearings for SD, perhaps similar 
to those used by the Brundtland Commission. 
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1. INTRODUCTION AND 
OBJECTIVES 
At the beginning of 1996, the EU's General Con-
sultative Forum on the Environment embarked on its 
most ambitious project — to develop three sce-
narios for a sustainable Europe in the year 2020 — 
which it presented to the Commission at its last 
plenary session in November 1996. The scenarios 
for a sustainable Europe present three different 
perspectives on environmental problems and eco-
nomic trends; on the meaning of sustainable devel-
opment; and on the policies and actions that are 
needed to attain it. They paint a contrasting picture 
of life in Europe in 2020, and outline the implica-
tions for the five selected target sectors of the fifth 
action programme. 
The Forum set five objectives for the scenarios 
project: 
1. To test and provoke the Forum's thinking about 
sustainability, building on its work so far; 
2. To help the European Commission develop its 
own 2020 vision for a sustainable Europe; 
3. To challenge policy-makers and the various 
stakeholders in sustainable development to de-
velop a more future-oriented approach to envi-
ronmental policy; 
4. To contribute to the definition of the agenda for 
the next Forum (1997-99); 
5. To communicate to a wider audience the com-
plexity and ¡nterdependencies involved in 
achieving a sustainable Europe, and provoke 
further thought on new ways of proceeding. 
Objectives 
Major concerns 
Scenario 1 
Surprises 
Scenario 3 
Recommendations 
Figure 1 : A model of the structure of the document 
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2. SCENARIOS 
2.1. Working with scenarios 
In the decade since the Brundtland Commission 
defined it as that which 'meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs', there have 
been at least 100 definitions of sustainable devel-
opment, each emphasizing different values, prior-
ities and ways forward. Sustainability, therefore, 
remains both a contested and a complex concept. 
In any discussion it is important to clarify what is 
being sustained over what and for how long, 
measured by what criteria, for whose benefit and 
at whose cost. 
One can only ever see a part of a system as 
complex as environmental and social sustainabil-
ity in Europe. In the words of the Economics 
Nobel Prize-winner Herbert Simon, 'the number 
of considerations that are potentially relevant to 
the effectiveness of any strategy or organizational 
design is so large that only a few of the more 
salient of these lie within the circle of awareness 
at any given time'. 
One of the ways to make sense of complexity is to 
construct models of reality in the form of scenarios 
or stories. Limited and limiting by definition, sce-
narios can be useful tools to help us model our key 
considerations and assumptions, and to identify 
gaps, inconsistencies, dilemmas and what we sim-
ply don't know. They can thereby help us expand 
our thinking, take on and explore possibilities that 
are new, or challenge the basis of some assump-
tions. A richer understanding may result. This can 
help us to incorporate resilience and the capacity to 
cope with turbulence and uncertainty in policy 
design. 
Why three scenarios and why these 
three scenar i osi 
One can construct a virtually infinite number of 
scenarios. But it is usually difficult to keep in mind 
more than three which are of sufficient complexity 
to be useful aids to thinking. 
These scenarios are three possible responses to the 
unfolding trends, challenges and opportunities iden-
tified in Section 2.2 (Major concerns about Europe's 
sustainability), and all three imply taking action to 
move away from the status quo. All three scenarios 
deal with the same set of issues, but respond to them 
in different ways. 
Section 2.3 presents in a matrix of 'headlines' 
how each scenario unfolds in a given sector. Each 
of the three scenarios is intended to be positive 
and a challenging vision of how the European 
Union could be moving toward sustainability by 
2020. Each of the scenarios is laid out more fully 
in Section 2.4, and broken down into: Driving 
forces; How the trends of the 1990s led to this 
scenario; Europe 2020 — Main theses; Europe 
2020 — Sectoral implications; Key indicators; 
Policy issues; and Threats and dilemmas. This is 
done in order to make the assumptions, ideas and 
problems underlying each scenario as explicit as 
possible. Each scenario suggests possible develop-
ments within a number of key sectors and issue 
areas, and also includes a short fictional narrative 
illustrating 'A day in the life' of a typical European 
at home and at work in 2020. 
Section 4 of this document contains a fully refer-
enced background analysis, which reviews avail-
able information on the main trends and projections 
at both the global and European levels, and which 
may be taken as evidence for one or more of the 
scenarios. The main themes contained in the sce-
narios are cross-referenced to the relevant section of 
this background analysis by means of numbers in 
square brackets — e.g.111 — which refer to the 
paragraph number in the annex. 
Using scenarios 
These scenarios were prepared specially for the 
Forum. They are based on a methodology found 
to be highly effective by businesses, governments, 
NGOs (non-governmental organizations) and oth-
ers. None of them is a prediction. The future 
may contain elements from all three. You may 
find that you strongly disagree with some ele-
ments of one or more of the scenarios. But you 
are invited to take part in an exercise where you 
may discover elements of legitimate concern in 
those elements you may tend to consider implau-
sible. 
Although the scenarios cover a broad range of 
environmental, economic and social issues at a 
broad level, it is clearly not possible for them to 
cover all possible issues in fine detail. This would 
not necessarily be desirable in any case, since the 
aim is for people to use the scenarios to explore 
implications and to try and answer such questions 
themselves, rather than for the scenarios to try to 
provide a complete set of answers. Similarly, the 
scenarios do not try to recommend which policies 
and actions are required to attain a given future, but 
instead they raise some of the key issues that 
policy-makers must face. 
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The scenarios are perhaps most effective when 
seen as a powerful tool to broaden perspectives,, 
raise questions and challenge conventional think-
ing. Used in this way, the scenarios for a sus-
tainable Europe provide an opportunity to further 
the development and implementation of policies 
and actions for sustainable development in 
Europe by: 
• Establishing a wider, more inclusive understand-
ing of sustainable development; 
• Fostering informed participation in SD decision-
making; 
• Empowering and legitimizing stakeholders with 
plural perspectives; 
• Fostering creative arid innovative thinking on SD; 
• Identifying blind spots and limiting assumptions; 
• Confronting the inherent complexity and uncer-
tainty of the future; 
• Enhancing the resilience of strategies and policies 
for SD; 
• Developing shared goals for a sustainable Europe; 
• Understanding priorities; 
• Pinpointing intermediate steps during the transi-
tion phase. 
Assumptions 
A number of common assumptions apply to all of 
these scenarios, and there are further assumptions 
that are specific to each scenario which are pre-
sented with the scenarios themselves in Section 1.3. 
The shared assumptions include the following: 
• Although Europe will be moving in the direction 
of sustainability by 2020, a totally sustainable 
Europe is most unlikely by that date; 
• Europe can only achieve sustainability in coop-
eration with the rest of the world; 
• By 2020, the current 15 Member States of the EU 
will hold only 5% of the world's people, with a 
low scenario of 360 million (fewer than today) 
and a high scenario of 422 million people; 
• In 2020, people aged over 60 in the EU will 
account for 25% of the total population (up from 
20% today), and people under 20 will fall to 
21.6% (from 25% today); 
• The European Union in 2020 could be much 
larger than today (14 countries have already 
applied at some point for EU membership, includ-
ing Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Esto-
nia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Norway, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland and 
Turkey. 
Surprises 
An inevitable issue in any future-oriented work is 
how to deal with surprises which, by their very 
nature, are unpredictable. If we look back 25 years 
to 1970, some of the surprises since then which 
have had an important influence include: 
• The Antarctic ozone hole, Chernobyl; 
• Successive oil shocks; the 'lost development dec-
ade'; Third World debt; 
• Deregulation and privatization; the stock market 
crash of 1987; emergence of the Asian 'tigers'; 
• The collapse of communism; the Gulf War; 
• Explosive growth of the IT industry; revolutionary 
change to management systems, organizational 
forms and financial markets. 
Looking ahead 25 years to 2020, we might see 
.surprises such as: 
• Revolutionary new energy and materials tech-
nologies; success of nanotechnology; 
• Another oil shock; 'meltdown' on the financial 
markets; 
• Bankruptcy and collapse of the United Nations 
system; 
• A major war in the European region; 
• Sudden perturbations of global climate or another 
major environmental disaster; 
• Large-scale values shifting towards environmen-
tally conscious lifestyles. 
The purpose of the scenarios is not to try and 
anticipate such surprises, and surprises are not 
included in the three scenarios. But we cannot 
ignore the possibility of surprises, both good and 
bad, when planning for the future. We can use the 
scenarios to help us 'simulate' future conditions and 
examine how different policies would be likely to 
cope with different kinds of surprises. In this way, 
the scenarios can help us to develop more resilient 
policies and institutions that can better cope with 
surprises. 
Health warning 
Finally, a counsel of humility when looking to the 
future. Recently, Peter Drucker, the writer on 
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business who, at 86, is still credited by many as 
the most astute observer of modern society, ar-
gued that 'the critical areas (China, Russia and 
India) are ones in which the Western democracies 
have practically no influence'. It is sobering to put 
the question of European sustainability into this 
wider context. But whether one agrees with Mr 
Drucker or not, it is surely true that there is far 
more in heaven and earth than can be dreamt of 
in our philosophy. 
2.2. Major concerns about 
Europe's sustainability 
There are a number of economic, social and envi-
ronmental trends which, if they continue un-
changed and are not acted upon, may lead'Europe 
in an unsustainable direction. There are other 
trends, such as the development of new technol-
ogies, innovative approaches to policy design and 
changes in consumption patterns, which hold op-
portunities for positive change. 
For the General Consultative Forum on the En-
vironment, 'the central challenge for Europe will 
be to ensure international competitiveness and 
high levels of employment during the transition 
towards a more environmental friendly and sus-
tainable economy' (see 12 principles on sustain-
able development, February 1995). Concern is 
also great among citizens of Community coun-
tries (see box). 
Europeans and the environment 
82% of Europeans think protecting the environ-
ment is an 'immediate and urgent problem' (this 
is 3 percentage points less than in 1992, but 8 to 
10 points more than in 1988 and 1986). National 
percentages are as follows: 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
76 
63 
86 
77 
7b 
85 
97 
76 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
89 
87 
— 
81 
82 
94 
80 
72% of Europeans (3 percentage points more than 
in 1992) consider that it is necessary to ensure 
economic development while protecting the envi-
ronment. 18% (-4 points) state that the environ-
ment should take precedence over the economy, 
and less than 6% (+2 points) think economic 
development should be given priority. 
Looking across the range of factors that influence 
Europe's prospects for sustainability, many trends 
stand out, including: 
Environment 
Continuing stress on air, water, biodiversity and 
land resources1321; 
Accelerating consumption of resources and en-
ergy, especially in the developing world1611; 
Growing emissions of C 0 2 and other greenhouse 
gases (65,76]. 
• Mounting concern about the links between envi-
ronmental quality and health1241. 
Economy 
• High unemployment and rapid changes in the 
nature of work'211; 
• Increasing emphasis placed upon competitive-
ness [4,21]. 
Source: 'Europeans and the environment', Eurobarometer 43.1 
bis, 1995. 
• Globalization, liberalization, privatization and 
deregulation1151; 
• Increasing interdependence through cross-border 
trade and investment; 
• The rise of the information economy1391. 
Society 
• Sense of insecurity and threats to cultural herit-
age; 
• Continuing population growth and cross-border 
movement of people1231; 
• Ageing of European populations, changing retire-
ment patterns ' ; 
• Widening disparities in society; growth of an 
'underclass'; drugs, crime, etc.[ '; 
• Changing family structures, values and life-
styles"261. 
Politics 
Growing distrust of traditional political struc-
tures1271; 
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• Rising nationalism, xenophobia and other chal-
lenges to democracy1231; 
• Increasing demands for transparency, openness 
and participation119,29,311; 
• New threats to international security1271; 
• Growing ineffectiveness of the policy process in 
the face of organized special interests. 
Technology 
• Rapid innovation in materials and energy tech-
nologies, biotechnology, communications and 
other fields1391. 
These trends may have different implications for 
development at regional, European and global lev-
els. But at the heart of concerns about Europe's 
unsustainability is the inability of policy, economic 
actors and society to cope with these trends or 
respond to them effectively. Moreover, there may be 
surprises which could generate additional risks or 
threats for a European environment and society that 
is already under stress. 
The exact unfolding of any of these trends into the 
future, and the changing nature of the forces that 
drive them, cannot be predicted. Some of them may 
accelerate along existing trajectories, while others 
may slow down or even reverse direction altogether. 
Although they are linked together in a systemic 
manner, many of them are independent of each 
other, and may evolve in seemingly contradictory 
directions. Their complexity defies simplistic analy-
sis, and provides an important reason for using 
scenario techniques. 
2.3. Three scenarios for a 
sustainable Europe: Some 
key factors, assumptions 
and questions — and a 
matrix of 'headlines' 
The three scenarios represent three different re-
sponses to a common.set of issues, as noted in 
Section 2.1. They all represent significant depar-
tures from the status quo trends identified in 
Section 2.2, and they are all 'hard choices' in the 
sense that they present significant challenges to 
business, government and citizens. Each scenario 
highlights and responds to some of the trends, and 
ignores, downplays or attempts to contro\ others. 
Each scenario includes both 'responses' to a series 
of challenges, and 'choices' for certain goals and 
opportunities. Leading responses and choices in 
the three scenarios may be summarized as fol-
lows: 
• Opening opportunities: The driving concern is 
Europe's ability to compete in the global market 
and create jobs, and the leading response is a 
focus on liberalization and market driven techno-
logical innovation as the way to safeguard eco-
nomic progress, and thereby afford environmen-
tal and social improvement. 
• Guiding change: The driving concern is growing 
social and economic security, and the leading 
response is new policies to provide the appropri-
ate signals to economic actors and to deliver a 
balance of cohesive social, environmental and 
economic outcomes. 
• Transforming communities: The driving concern 
is the inability of current policies to get to the root 
of social and environmental decline, and the 
response is a reform of priorities to favour quali-
tative development over quantitative growth. The 
choice is for stronger communities, high goals of 
human development, and simpler, less stressful 
lifestyles. 
Each scenario is entirely independent of the others, 
and the order of the scenarios is in no way signifi-
cant. In particular, the existence of one does not 
stem from the failure of another, and no 'progres-
sion' of any sort is intended to be implied by the 
particular order in which the scenarios are pre-
sented below. All of thè scenarios envisage a role for 
industry, government and civil society, and take 
account of Europe's relations with the rest of the 
world. No scenario is intended to be more or less 
favourable to a particular group in society. All of the 
scenarios have explicit and implicit values, and all 
of them imply a particular attitude to risk and 
uncertainty. 
The matrix on the next two pages summarizes key 
factors under each scenario. 
24 
Driving forces 
Energy 
Agriculture 
Transport 
IT, telecommunications 
and manufacturing 
Scenario 1: 
Opening 
opportunities 
• Policies of 1990s fail to 
deliver growth and jobs. 
• Problems tackled and 
environmental quality 
improved through growth 
and innovation based on 
more liberal policies. 
• Growing move towards 
individual choice and 
responsibility. 
• New social, economic 
and technological 
structures emerging with 
the information economy. 
• All subsidies removed. 
• Liberalization of energy 
markets — fossil and 
non-fossil compete freely. 
• Energy intensity 
continues to decrease. 
• The common agricultural 
policy (CAP) being 
completely phased out. 
• Biotechnology increases 
productivity and reduces 
environmental impact. 
• Land unsuited to 
agriculture taken out of 
production. 
• Personal vehicles and 
privatized networks are 
universal. 
• Vehicles are hyper clean 
and efficient, both in 
production and use. 
• Sophisticated traffic 
management systems 
reduce congestion. 
• IT has in any case 
reduced the demand for 
travel faster than was 
predicted in the 1990s. 
• Dematerialization and 
efficiency improvements 
driven by innovation and 
intelligent systems. 
• Resulting environmental 
benefits are an incidental 
but significant bonus. 
• Strict environmental 
liability is major driver 
for industrial clean-up. 
Scenario 2: 
Guiding change 
• Market alone is unable to 
solve problems unguided. 
• Social and economic 
disparities are increasing, 
environmental issues are 
not being resolved. 
• Popular support for 
integrated solutions to 
balance economy and 
environment. 
• Citizens welcome a 
stronger government role 
in maintaining standards 
of living and securing 
stability and certainty ¡η 
a changing world. 
• EU-wide energy strategy. 
• Taxes and incentives for 
energy efficiency. 
• Large R&D programmes 
for non-fossil fuel energy. 
• Nuclear power still used. 
• CAP is an integrated 
agriculture and land-use 
policy, with 
environmental protection 
a priority. 
• Low input/Organic' 
agriculture replaces 
'conventional'. 
• A few carefully 
controlled biotech 
applications. 
• Private vehicles heavily 
controlled and taxed. 
• Investment to improve 
infrastructure, user 
information and vehicles. 
• Mandatory targets for 
pollutants such as VOCs. 
• Manufacturers required 
to develop ultra clean-
burn engines for 
'hypercars'. 
• Taxes on freight-miles are 
incentive to minimize 
packaging, source 
locally. 
• Steady increases in eco-
efficiency due to 
incentives and 
regulations. 
• EU develops integrated IT 
and clean manufacturing 
strategy. 
• Large EU R&D support 
and subsidies for 
perceived strategic 
'clean' technologies. 
Scenario 3: 
Transforming 
communities 
• Societal tolerance for 
social, environmental and 
health problems has 
reached its limit. 
• Solutions require 
significant change in the 
course of economic and 
social development. 
• Desire for stronger 
communities, more focus 
on real quality of life, and 
simpler and less stressful 
lifestyles. 
• High taxes on fossil fuels. 
• Intervention programmes 
for photovoltaic and other 
non-fossil energy. 
• Nuclear power phased 
out altogether. 
• CAP becomes a system of 
incentives for Community 
supported agriculture, 
stressing local production. 
• The 'permaculture' 
approach reduces land 
and water needs, while 
increasing productivity. 
• Transport, especially by 
ajr and road, is very 
strictly limited (for 
example, a 70% cut in 
car use compared to 
1995). 
• Almost all transport of 
people is by public 
vehicles. 
• Land-use patterns and 
lifestyles are changing to 
accommodate reduced 
mobility. 
• IT and 
telecommunications 
remain very important in 
a world of reduced 
mobility. 
• Highly durable, 
recyclable products form 
bulk of demand. 
• Almost all enterprises see 
themselves as providers of 
services rather than 
products. 
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Consumption and 
Lifestyles 
Cities 
Science and 
technology 
Europe: Regional 
and international 
dimensions 
Institutions 
Scenario 1: 
Opening 
opportunities 
• Information-rich retailing 
means consumers more 
aware of health and 
environment issues. 
• New markets for more 
environmentally sensitive 
products, services and 
forms of leisure, 
including greener 
tourism. 
• Some consumers demand 
super-'green'/'fair' trade 
products. 
• Cities are refurbished and 
become attractive again. 
• Efficiency increases and 
new applications of 
telematics obviate need 
for radical overhaul of 
planning. 
• New technologies permit 
growth while using 
energy and other 
resources more 
efficiently. 
• Widespread use of 
telematics and IT. 
• Most R&D is conducted 
in private sector, 
although governments 
continue to fund basic 
research. 
• EU role limited to 
defending integrity of 
internal market, 
managing external trade 
policy and maintaining 
price stability. 
• Global trade and 
investment liberalization 
diminishes EU policy 
role. 
• Importance goes to city-
regions able to attract 
foreign investment. 
• Governments make 
markets work efficiently 
and make better use of 
the creative forces of 
entrepreneurship. 
• Open and accessible 
markets. 
• More streamlined 
regulatory systems with 
clear ana equitably 
enforced rules. 
• Sound and transparent 
financial and legal 
systems, and efficient 
administration. 
Scenario 2: 
Guiding change 
• Information awareness 
campaigns promote 
demand for clean, 
efficient and locally 
produced products. 
• 'Green' alternatives are 
available, not expensive, 
and accompanied by 
'neutral' performance 
information. 
• Tourism much more 
tightly regulated than in 
the past. 
• EU-wide strategy for 
sustainable cities. 
• Bold initiatives in 
planning and higher 
building standards reduce 
travel demand, energy 
and water use. 
• Regulations and 
incentives to ensure that 
'environmentally-
friendly' goods and 
services are not at a 
disadvantage. 
• Substantially increased 
and more coherent R&D, 
particularly at EU level. 
• European dimension key 
to SD. 
• Decision-making 
procedures reformed. 
• Ineffective regulations 
removed and replaced. 
• Fiscal policy is matter of 
shared sovereignty 
between EU and Member 
States, facilitating 
ecological tax reform. 
• Government role to 
achieve full integration of 
environmental, social 
and economic policies. 
• Active participation of all 
the main actors in society 
(administrations, 
enterprises, general 
public). 
• Broadening and 
deepening of the 
instruments for control 
and behavioural change. 
• Greater use of market 
forces. 
Scenario 3: 
Transforming 
communities 
• No consumption growth 
in pounds of material 
weight; use of services 
grows. 
• Goods have much higher 
design and conceptual 
input, thanks to pervasive 
changes in values. 
• Society is changing along 
the lines of 'not more but 
better': a shift from 
quantity to quality. 
• Eco-villages and towns. 
• Economic role of cities 
changes drastically in line 
with changing social and 
economic priorities. 
• Few new buildings are 
taller than a tree. 
• New technologies are 
needed for radical 
ecological modernization 
and maximum recycling 
efficiency. 
·. Research is increasingly 
directed to meeting real 
needs in a socially and 
environmentally 
compatible manner. 
• 1980s/90s focus on EU 
integration replaced by 
focus on promoting robust 
local and regional 
economies. 
• IT/networking minimizes 
resource flows, transport. 
• EU treaties modified, give 
priority to environmental 
sustainability over free 
flow of goods and 
services. 
• Government role to make 
sure that a country does 
not exceed environmental 
space, and that the use of 
that space is distributed in 
a socially acceptable way. 
• Government policy 
screened for elements 
obstructing SD. 
• Institutions increasingly 
decentralized, 
participatory and 
community-focused. 
26 
2.4. Three scenarios for a 
sustainable Europe 
Scenario 1: Opening opportunities 
Scenario 1 — Driving forces 
EU policies of the 1990s fail to deliver growth and 
jobs1211. The only way to solve these problems, and 
to improve environmental quality, is to innovate and 
grow through more liberal policies188,891. These 
policies also satisfy the move towards individual 
choice and responsibility, as well as the changing 
social, economic and technological structures that 
are emerging with the information economy. 
Scenario 1 — How the trends of the 
1990s led to this scenario 
Continuing trends: Globalization, liberalization and 
technological innovation continue apace; increas-
ing cross-border trade and investment, and growing 
competition from Asia and China141; strong focus on 
competitiveness and economic progress; rapid tran-
sition to post-industrial, information society 'and 
subsequent change in patterns of economic and 
business organisation and work and home life. 
Declining trends: Limited change in consumer val-
ues and consumption patterns1911, slowing of social 
and environmental decline. 
Scenario 1 — Europe 2020: 
Main themes 
The economic dimension: Economic development 
is based on new patterns of more 'eco-efficient' 
growth emphasizing services, knowledge and new 
materials. Knowledge is viewed as the key resource 
of the European information economy, and is now 
high value and high cost. The economy is cleaner, 
leaner, more productive and more competitive1881. 
Governments have reduced the number of areas in 
which they act and control. They emphasize pro-
moting competition, and there is strong anti-trust 
law. Privatization has continued, subsidies to indus-
try have stopped, and there are no longer any 
national 'champions'. Markets are very responsive 
to consumer demand, and there is a strong market 
for 'green' products, although this is still limited to a 
niche market of consumers, as it was in the 1990s. 
Financial markets play an important role in the 
'greening' of industry, not least because of the strict 
liability laws. 
The social dimension: The social partners embrace 
the need for continuous change, for a shift towards 
a high-skill economy, despite the social dislocations 
and changes in employment patterns that this en-
tails. Social services provide a 'floor' of basic serv-
ices such as health and education, which includes 
education up to secondary level, and a social 'safety 
net'. Other services are privatized and opened up to 
competition, resulting in improved service at lower 
cost. 
The environmental dimension: Growth now has few 
environmental impacts, with production and con-
sumption progressively de-linked from resource use 
and pollution. The benefits from growth are also 
used to fund the great clean-up of the pollution 
legacy from thé 20th century. Environmental policy 
has moved from technology-driven standards to 
ambient quality standards, within a framework of 
least-cost regulation. Market mechanisms drive im-
provement through the combination of strong trad-
able property rights and liability law. There are 
targets for environmental improvements, but these 
are set and adhered to through voluntary agree-
ments. Distorting production subsidies, notably in 
the CAP and in energy markets, have been ended. 
This has not only improved environmental incen-
tives but also economic efficiency. Environmental 
campaigners focus their attention on building 
tightly-knit alliances with the business sector and 
consumers to accelerate the diffusion of cleaner 
technologies and products. 
The political dimension: Following the move to a 
single currency, the European Union of 25 Member 
States rationalized its mandate to limit its role to 
defending the integrity of the internal market, man-
aging external trade policy and maintaining price 
stability: Global trade and investment liberalization 
diminishes the importance of EU policy. Great 
importance goes to city-regions able to attract mo-
bile foreign investment, which form like-minded 
networks within and outside the EU. Even where 
government takes more of a 'back seat' role, there 
are new forms of governance that fill the vacuum 
and guide corporate behaviour. Citizen mistrust of 
government and business information on the sus-
tainable development performance of production 
and products gives way to independent certification 
by coalitions of environment, development, trade 
union and human rights organizations for sensitive 
goods (food, forest products, health care, tourism 
and transport)1311. 
The international dimension: The EU is no longer 
preoccupied with presenting itself externally as a 
bloc. There has been limited liberalization of immi-
gration, attracting skilled workers to support the 
economy as Europeans age. Europe retains an 
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influential, albeit diminished, role within the new 
G7 (EU, NAFTA, China, India, ASEAN, the Latin 
American 'Mercosur' free trade area, and the Rus-
sian Federation). Foreign direct investment contin-
ues to grow faster than trade, which in turn grows 
faster than GDP, and the economy is now truly 
global in scale and connection. EU exports have 
grown from 15% to 30% of GDP19'121. Aid to 
developing countries has been reduced as it has not 
generally worked, and is now focused purely on 
basic needs and humanitarian concerns. EU internal 
and external markets have been fully opened, and 
the move to global free trade proves to be of far 
greater benefit to developing countries than aid 
used to be. Global environmental issues are tackled 
through joint implementation and negotiated agree-
ments, but the WTO social and environmental 
standards have not changed since the 1990s. The 
Rio logic of publicly financed sustainable develop-
ment as a model for resolving environmental issues 
is now discredited. 
Scenario 1 — Europe 2020: 
Sectoral implications 
progressively cleaner and more efficient and VOCs 
and other pollutant levels are significantly reduced 
as a result. Traffic management systems become 
increasingly sophisticated to reduce congestion. IT 
has in any case reduced the demand for travel faster 
than was predicted in the 1990s1481. 
Scenario 1 — A day in the life: 
A European at home and work 
Adrianna has a breakfast of muesli made from grains 
genetically engineered to be resistant to pests and 
disease. Then she gets ready for work. Adrianna 
drives a 'hypercar' taxi (a lightweight, streamlined 
vehicle from Daewoo Poland which consumes 20% 
of the fuel and emits 10% of the pollution of mid 
1990s models). The vehicle's onboard computer 
continually downloads data on traffic flows and 
congestion from the city's privatized traffic authority, 
and advises her how she can maximize the number of 
fares she will take today. Adrianna used to be an 
opera singer and prize-winning cook; but there is less 
demand than ever for such skills in 2020, and the 
pressures to work long hours are growing. 
Agriculture: EU agriculture becomes more and more 
competitive on the world market. Price support and 
quotas are abolished, leading to significantly re-
duced agricultural expenditure, which is-essential in 
a growing EU. Agriculture increasingly takes place 
in large mechanised operations as more 'marginal' 
farmers go out of business. This takes pressure off 
natural resources, which can be preserved in pro-
tected areas. Increasing use is made of biotechnol-
ogy and external inputs, which are necessary for a 
world where many countries cannot feed them-
selves1801. 
Energy. Technological progress has resulted in sig-
nificant decreases in energy and carbon intensity as 
smokestack industries close. Energy systems are 
moving towards gas and nuclear power, and are 
aiming towards hydrogen as an energy carrier. 
Subsidies and incentives are removed from fuel 
extraction, energy generation and distribution. Fos-
sil and non-fossil fuel companies (none of them 
State owned) compete in an open market. Nuclear 
power only becomes competitive if commercial 
solutions are found for waste disposal. As current 
known reserves become depleted it becomes more 
viable to use non-fossil fuels, or to extract from less 
accessible sources. Improving energy efficiency has 
become more and more important since it saves 
money. Energy intensity continues to decrease1701. 
Transport Access to efficient transport is vital for 
economic growth and is a personal right. Private 
cars are the main mode of transport and networks 
are privatized. Governments regulate only on essen-
tial issues of health and safety. Vehicles become 
Scenario 1 — Key indicators 
• 3% annual GDP growth, leading to a doubling of 
EU per capita GDP; 
• Reduction in public spending from 50 to 30% of 
GDP; 
• Low inflation and stable money; 
• Indicators are GNP and separate, non-integrated, 
satellite environmental accounts. 
Scenario 1 — Policy issues, potential 
threats and dilemmas 
Environment: 
• Wil l an approach based on property rights and 
liability create a US-style litigious society? 
• How will common resources be managed in a 
system based on individual environmental prop-
erty rights? 
• Can the market deliver environmental quality 
standards, and is it vulnerable to surprise? 
• Wil l there be adequate sanctions against environ-
mental laggards? 
• Can a mechanism for safe management and dis-
posal of nuclear waste be found? 
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• Does the EU have the capacity to deregulate on 
environmental policy? 
• Can the eco-efficiency 'treadmill' be sus-
tained?1901 
Declining trends: Less focus on innovation and 
economic growth as ends in themselves, few new 
breakthroughs in materials, manufacturing proc-
esses or energy technologies. 
Economy: 
• What can be done about free riders, globally or 
nationally? 
• Can the EU sustain the innovation needed to drive 
economic development? 
• What is the future of service sector jobs in the face 
of global competition? 
Society: 
• How will society cope with increasing job inse-
curity and stress? 
• How can increasing disparities in wealth and 
their social effects be dealt with? 
Scenario 2: Guiding change 
Scenario 2 — Driving forces 
The market alone is seen to be unable to solve 
problems unguided: social and economic disparities 
are increasing, while environmental issues are not 
being resolved. Following a period of social and 
environmental decline, there is a new burst of 
political wil l and popular support for measures to 
create integrated solutions and find a balance be-
tween the economy and the environment. Citizens 
welcome a stronger government role in maintaining 
standards of living and securing stability and cer-
tainty in a changing world. 
Scenario 2 — How the trends of the 
1990s led to this scenario 
Continuing trends: Environmental and social de-
cline continues; continuing stress on air, water, 
biodiversity and land resources; accelerating emis-
sions'of greenhouse gases; insecurity and persistent 
unemployment, and growing numbers of old people 
faced with declining social security systems; grow-
ing nationalism and populism; growing disparities 
in society, crime, drugs and the rise of an under-
class1251. 
Scenario 2 — Europe 2020: Main 
themes 
The economic dimension: The EU is co-funding 
large-scale investments in environmental infrastruc-
ture, including transport systems, waste treatment, 
and new and renewable energy supplies. These 
investments have a win-win result by also providing 
a Keynesian boost to employment. There is a man-
aged wind-down of unsustainable industries, sup-
ported by re-training and subsidy schemes. New 
structures emerge for reaching 'voluntary agree-
ments' among governments, businesses, trade un-
ions and environmental organizations on key tran-
sition issues, such as the phase-out of unsustainable 
technologies in a way that does not affect jobs, and 
changing consumption patterns through environ-
mental organizations mobilizing their membership 
to action. Green groups focus lobbying efforts on 
using EU regulations and funding to pull up envi-
ronmental performance in Eastern and Central 
Europe13a34Í. 
The social dimension: Society has high levels of 
security and social services and a strong economy, 
although with limited conspicuous consumption. 
There are common welfare systems that provide for 
the possibility of a dignified livelihood rather than 
just providing a minimal social safety net. Compul-
sory savings schemes are in place to promote sav-
ings and investment and limit short-term consump-
tion. Basic rights to environmental quality, social 
security and employment have been enshrined in a 
'Charter of basic social, environmental and eco-
nomic rights' for all Europeans. The EU sees its role 
as protecting the livelihood of Europeans, rather 
than European companies. Where there are trade-
offs, the EU seeks to favour citizens. At the same 
time, it is legitimate to limit personal freedoms for 
the good of society as a whole. Rights to social and 
environmental quality, as well as to information, 
have been strengthened since the 1990s. There is 
extensive participation with stakeholders and citi-
zens at local and national levels to set priorities and 
guide policy development. 
The environmental dimension: There is universal 
producer responsibility for environmental impacts. 
Information is seen as a public good, rather than a 
commodity to be traded on markets, and the Eco-
Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS), toxic re-
lease inventories, labelling and life cycle analysis 
(LCA) are all mandatory. There are subsidies to 
promote eco-efficient companies, and also to fund 
environmental research and development1341. 
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The political dimension: The legitimate role of 
governments as stewards of the public good has 
been reaffirmed. Their overall priority is to maintain 
standards of living, within a context of stability and 
certainty. Market approaches are used as important 
tools of policy, but it is recognized that markets 
cannot guarantee social or environmental results, or 
the speed of their attainment. Markets are therefore 
not used to set targets, which is a social and political 
process, and policy ensures that narrow economic 
rationality does not endanger other goals. To pro-
mote the transition to sustainability, governments 
seek to change corporate and consumer behaviour, 
and universalize best practice, through a radical 
overhaul of regulations and incentives. The Euro-
pean dimension is central to the realization of 
sustainable development. Decision-making proce-
dures are reformed to allow old, ineffective regula-
tions to be removed and replaced by a smaller 
number of new and effective ones. Fiscal policy 
becomes a subject of shared sovereignty between 
the Union and the Member States, facilitating eco-
logical tax reform. Ecological tax reform is seen as 
an incentive rather than a way to make prices tell an 
indeterminate ecological 'truth'. All these changes 
require a large infusion of political wil l . Other 
mechanisms of environmental policy include infor-
mation, transparency, fiscal measures and educa-
tion. 
The international dimension: The economy is pre-
dominantly ¡ntra-regional rather than global, and 
EU policy focuses on the internal market. There is an 
EU-wide commitment to maintain public services in 
health, education and key utilities such as energy, 
water and telecommunications. Externally, Europe 
plays a strategic role in mediating between China 
and the US. The EU has strong borders, and contin-
ues a policy of managed trade. In particular, WTO's 
social and environmental standards are tightened. 
Aid is targeted to help developing countries make 
the 'green' transition117181. 
Scenario 2 — Europe 2020: 
Sectoral implications 
Transport Transport policy across the EU becomes 
more coherent, and great emphasis is put on the 
integration of different modes. Walking and cycling 
are encouraged. Investment focuses on improving 
infrastructure (including development of light rail 
systems in many cities), user information and the 
cleanliness and efficiency of vehicles. Pollutants 
such as VOCs are nearly eliminated via mandatory 
targets. Private vehicles and fuel are heavily taxed, 
thus contributing revenue to enhanced public trans-
port systems. There are increasing restrictions on the 
number of cars allowed into certain areas at certain 
times, particularly city centres. Manufacturers are 
required to develop alternatives to the internal 
combustion engine by 20151481. 
Energy: Significant effort is made to reduce carbon 
dioxide emissions, including the introduction of 
carbon and energy taxes and incentives for effi-
ciency. Reformed energy and transport policies for 
the whole European Union help reduce the growth 
in oil consumption. A major switch to gas is made, 
largely part for environmental reasons. As part of an 
EU-wide strategy that includes targets for increased 
energy efficiency there are large R&D programmes 
for non-fossil fuel energy1741. 
Agriculture: The common agricultural policy (CAP) 
becomes an integrated agriculture and land-use 
policy, with environmental protection (including 
restoration of degraded land) a priority. Low input 
and 'organic' agriculture replaces 'conventional' 
agriculture, and a few very carefully controlled 
biotechnology applications are slowly coming on-
l ine [80] 
Scenario 2 — A day in the life: 
A European at home and work 
Over a breakfast of organic sausages (each precisely 
labelled and coded by contents and packaging) 
Brunhilde and her daughter Inge check the laundry 
and recycling roster on their interface to the 
apartment-block computer. It's Inge's turn to perform 
the communal duties. But she doesn't mind because 
the chores wil l earn them a few credits which wil l be 
good for anything from a bird watching trip to her 
university saving funds. 
Brunhilde take the superfast tram from the corner of 
their block directly to the local business centre in the 
old city centre. Brunhilde works at Resources pic, an 
environmental consultancy that specializes in 
providing sustainable resource management 
solutions. Resources pic has thrived since the 
introduction of legislation that sharply curtails the 
exploitation of new mineral reserves and water 
supply sources.' But Brunhilde is worried. She knows 
the group of companies to which hers belongs is in 
deep financial trouble. The competitive position 
vis-à- vis US and East Asian multinationals is simply 
untenable, and large-scale job losses are inevitable. 
Scenario 2 — Key indicators 
• 2.5% economic growth to resolve the social/ 
economic/environmental trade-offs; 
• Unemployment reduced from 11 to 7%; 
• The standard of living for citizens is maintained 
and where possible improved; 
• Tax reform is mostly revenue neutral, but taxes do 
not decline; 
30 
• The 1990s rush to globalization and liberalization 
is limited; 
• Indicators of progress include human develop-
ment index (HDI) and a limited green GNP'7 ' ; 
• Reduction in C0 2 emissions to meet Toronto 
targets (20% cut by 2005); 
• Target is for no critical environmental loads to be 
exceeded; 
• There are strict reduce/re-use/recycle targets. 
styles which will put the goals of social justice and 
environmental sustainability first. This means imple-
menting policies that strengthen local communities, 
expand the social economy, tackle vested interests 
and encourage less stressful lifestyles. 
Scenario 3 — How the trends 
of the 1990s led to this scenario 
Scenario 2 — Policy issues, 
potential threats and dilemmas 
How can the necessary trade-offs between eco-
nomic, social and environmental goals be made? 
Who decides what the trade-offs should be? 
Is 2.5% growth together with a 20% cut in C0 2 
emissions realistic? 
How strong can social and environmental limits 
to trade be without endangering the global trad-
ing system? 
Wil l there be enough political wil l to change 
framework conditions and impose solutions that 
will be unpopular with certain interest groups? 
What wil l be the impact in developing countries 
of EU trade restrictions? 
Will fiscal instruments for environmental quality 
add to growing divisions between rich and poor? 
Will the cost of environmental targets and re-
quirements be prohibitive, especially for small 
companies? 
Is it really possible to 'have everything' as the 
win-win argument suggests? 
Will tough environmental targets constrain inno-
vation and competitiveness? 
How quickly wil l the possibilities for cheap envi-
ronmental win-win solutions be exhausted? 
Is it realistic to imagine changing the WTO? 
Scenario 3: Transforming communities 
Scenario 3 — Driving forces 
EU policies of the 1990s fail to tackle the root 
causes of growing social insecurity, declining qual-
ity of life and environmental degradation. There is a 
spreading conviction that radical changes are re-
quired to markets, government regulation and life-
Continuing trends: Environmental and social de-
cline continued, and the traditional policy-making 
process became increasingly ineffective in the face 
of organized special interests. This resulted in de-
mands for tougher government action, along with 
pressures for greater transparency, openness and 
participation, producing more decentralized and 
community oriented decision-making systems. Atti-
tudes to environment, work and lifestyles continue 
to develop along the lines of 'not more, but better' 
and people seek greater satisfaction from social and 
cultural relations rather than increased material 
wealth1941. 
Declining trends: The 1990s stress on globalization, 
liberalization and privatization is greatly reduced. 
Competitiveness in the 1990s definition becomes 
less important, as economies become more local-
ized. Much less faith is placed in the ability of 
technological innovation alone to deliver environ-
mental improvement. 
Scenario 3 — Europe 2020: 
Main themes 
The economic dimension: European policy now 
aims to achieve a triple balance between the public, 
commercial and social economy sectors; between 
the local, European and global levels of develop-
ment; and between work, leisure and community 
action. Government efforts are especially geared 
towards providing an economic framework within 
which enterprises seeking to satisfy Europe's rising 
social needs (in particular urban regeneration and 
care for the elderly) can prosper. Tax reform has 
shifted the fiscal burden away from individuals and 
enterprise and onto resource use, pollution and 
'speculation'. There are controls on capital move-
ments and a speculative tax, along the lines of the 
Tobin tax proposed in the 1990s l1 . A new wave of 
community-based organizations promote local de-
velopment techniques such as micro-credit and 
local currencies. Economic policy-making is also' 
based on an analysis of a more complex range of 
social, economic and environmental indicators, us-
ing new indices such as the ISEW alongside mon-
etary measuresl7,8'. Targets for economic growth are 
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set within a broader context of Europe's 'fair share' 
of global ecological carrying capacity. 
The social dimension: Changing the pattern of de-
velopment has greatly reduced the need for defen-
sive expenditures, and as a result people begin to 
feel a higher quality of life as measured in terms of 
happiness and optimism as distinct from purely 
material wealth. The focus on meeting real needs 
has catalysed job creation in fields such as helping 
the aged, primary health care, community services 
and improving environmental quality. Enjoyment is 
increasingly experienced through 'low impact' ac-
tivities such as art, music and appreciation of the 
natural world rather than environmentally-intensive 
goods such as sports cars and foreign travel. Envi-
ronment and development groups target their re-
sources on developing their own solutions to unsus-
tainable consumption and production patterns. 
The environmental dimension: The technological, 
institutional and economic limits to eco-efficiency 
have become apparent. Addressing environmental 
concerns therefore requires priority being placed on 
radical reductions in resource use and pollution 
through changes in infrastructure, lifestyles and the 
scale of the economy. Prices increasingly 'tell the 
ecological truth' as governments internalize costs 
through ecological tax reform. The proximity princi-
ple is used as a planning device to encourage the 
expansion of local and regional patterns of produc-
tion and consumption, thereby cutting unnecessary 
freight and personal transport. Powerful moral pres-
sure is exerted against conspicuous consumption, 
even stronger than pressure against smoking in the 
late 1990s. European environmental regulation on 
transport requires the elimination of large-engined 
and inefficient vehicles. Most local authorities now ' 
take tough action to curb waste at source through 
taxation, planning and awareness raising. Nuclear 
power and the use of chlorine in industrial processes 
have been largely phased out, and policies seek to 
decrease use of fossil fuels to sustainable levels as 
rapidly as possible. New technological development 
concentrates on more appropriate technology that is 
environmentally sound, durable, cheap, easy to 
maintain, and suited to its task. Environment and 
development groups target their resources on devel-
oping their own solutions to unsustainable con-
sumption and production patterns. 
The political dimension: Greater decision-making 
powers are awarded to the European Parliament as 
the elected arm of the Union. Policies become more 
accountable to parliamentary review and critique. 
Following the 'success of the 'Local Agenda 2 1 ' 
movement, the 1990s debate on subsidiarity is 
taken forward with new emphasis being placed on 
decentralization. The primacy placed on economic 
integration at the European level in the 1980s and 
1990s is modified with greater emphasis given to 
promoting robust local and regional economies, 
and minimizing unnecessary resource flows and 
transport through widespread use of IT and network-
ing. EU treaty provisions are modified to allow both 
Member States and regions to give priority to envi-
ronmental sustainability over the free flow of goods 
and services. The voluntary social auditing of the 
1990s has evolved into stakeholder co-determina-
tion boards in major transnational companies, ad-
vising management on corporate strategy and the 
trajectory of innovation '19 '. 
The international dimension: The EU has a greatly 
reduced, but still significant, role in the world. It has 
lightened its ecological footprint and cut its reliance 
on imported material and energy resources. This 
improves Europe's security by reducing depend-
ence on unstable regions, notably the Middle East. 
The EU has taken the lead in establishing interna-
tional trading schemes for scarce environmental 
resources and global pollution (such as C02). The 
revenues from these are targeted at an expanded 
and refocused international development effort, tar-
geted at tackling the root causes of poverty world-
wide. The power of transnational corporations has 
been limited, and stakeholder management ensures 
that corporate decisions are truly in the global 
interest [141 
Scenario 3 — Europe 2020: 
Sectoral implications 
Transport Transport, especially by air and road, is 
heavily restricted. Large areas of cities are pedestri-
anized and land-use patterns and lifestyles are 
changing to reduce the need for mobility. Local 
sourcing of goods takes priority wherever possible. 
Good public transport systems are designed to cater 
for the needs of everyone in the community and most 
journeys are by foot, bicycle or public transport1501. 
Energy: Nuclear power is phased out by 2010 and a 
programme of radical change to energy supply and 
demand is implemented with the aim of phasing out 
fossil fuel use after 2100. The energy content of 
goods and services is analysed to identify the most 
effective way of reducing energy use, which is the 
main priority. The reduction in transport substan-
tially reduces demand for oil, and a major initiative 
to improve the energy efficiency of buildings yields 
significant reductions in household energy con-
sumption. Fossil fuels are heavily taxed and a large 
intervention programme for photovoltaic and other 
non-fossil fuels is implemented, with an emphasis 
on local generation. Partnerships wivth other parts of 
the world (both developed and developing) help to 
defray costs176'771. 
Agriculture: The common agricultural policy (CAP) 
becomes a system of incentives for Community-
supported agriculture, stressing local production. 
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The 'permaculture' approach reduces land and 
water needs, while increasing productivity1811. 
What if measures taken are still not adequate to 
cope with environmental change? 
Scenario 3 — A day in the life: 
A European at home and work 
Angharad is up before dawn and, as the sun rises, she 
picks plums, pears and apples in the community 
square that, together with the solar heated swimming 
pool, is surrounded on three sides by the 40 'low-
impact' homes of their urban 'village' — a 
redeveloped inner city block. Nick—Angharad'sold 
father — calls to her from the kitchen, where (despite 
his advanced age) he's prepared a delicious breakfast 
of garden produce and fish from the nearby stream. 
Angharad loves her home life, but is greatly frustrated 
by the lack of opportunities in her working 
environment. Although she doesn't mind taking 
elderly people to and fro in a rickshaw, she feels 
frustrated that there have been so few opportunities 
for her to develop her business acumen and to travel 
far afield. And, like many people in 2020, she is 
anxious at the apparent incapacity of the EU to face 
up to Chinese expansion. 
Scenario 3 — Key indicators 
• Phasing out nuclear power; 
• Improved quality of life as measured by indicator 
of sustainable economic welfare (ISEW); 
• Reduction of economic disparities, no poverty or 
homelessness; 
• Progress toward elimination of fossil fuels as 
rapidly as possible; 
• Less economic and industrial concentration; 
• Working week reduced to 30 hours, widespread 
work-sharing; 
• Changing consumption patterns, increasing prod-
uct durability, less travel; 
• More communal resources (e.g. libraries), more 
hire and less purchase of goods; 
• More sharing of economic and family activities 
among men and women. 
Scenario 3 — Policy issues, 
potential threats and dilemmas 
Environment 
What if some environmental concerns prove to be 
overstated? 
Economy and politics 
• Is a steady-state economy really possible? Can we 
step off the economic 'treadmill'? Where will jobs 
come from? 
• Wil l there be mass capital flight from the EU? Are 
there adequate returns in a steady-state economy? 
• Wil l industry leave the EU? What would be the 
impacts on jobs and society? 
• Wil l government be able to get a mandate for 
significant cost internalization? 
• How can policies be coordinated in a decentral-
ized EU? 
• How will free riders or objectors be dealt with? 
Society 
• Wil l Europeans accept the declining importance 
of a steady-state EU in a growing world? 
• Wil l threats to individual liberties and lifestyles be 
acceptable? 
• What role is there for individual aspiration and 
ambition? 
• Who do citizens feel solidarity with? Global 
eco-rationing or local community values? Can 
'thinking globally and acting locally' work? 
2.5. How the scenarios 
respond to the concerns 
expressed by the 
Consultative Forum 
In response to the scenarios, the Forum identified 
five key clusters as the key values and concerns that 
should guide the shaping of SD policies: 
• Employment and competitiveness; 
• Environment, nature and health; 
• Social security and cohesion; 
• Cultural diversity; 
• Personal freedom and democracy. 
Set out below is an indication of how the scenarios 
respond to the concerns: 
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Employment 
Environment 
Social security 
Culture 
Democracy 
Scenario 1: 
Opening 
opportunities 
New opportunities through 
the information/service 
economy. But dilemmas: 
constant change, job 
insecurity and likely 
convergence of wages to 
global levels. 
High value placed on 
personal health and private 
environment. But dilemmas: 
can individual health be 
isolated? How to manage 
common goods? 
Privatized; minimal safety 
net. Dilemma: danger of 
rising social divisions, crime; 
breakdown of social contract 
and cultural diversity. 
Whole new global cultural 
dimensions open up, but 
Europeans fear a loss of 
identity. * 
Consumer first; minimal role 
for public choice. Dilemma: 
how to prevent plutocracy; 
what happens if the poor 
have no stake in society? 
Scenario 2: 
Guiding change 
Public backed employment 
rights and retraining 
assistance. Dilemma is cost 
and inflexibility. 
Strategies and targets 
achieved by regulatory 
reform and incentives. 
Ecological values balanced 
with social and economic. 
Dilemma: will there be 
enough political will? How 
can trade-offs be made? 
Maintain services and extend 
rights, using the market as a 
possible provider. Dilemma: 
will this cost more than 
Europe can afford? 
Subsidies for European arts 
and culture and restraints on 
foreign imports. Dilemma: 
can you control a borderless 
global culture? 
Emphasis on representative 
democracy and formal rights. 
But are parliamentary 
systems sufficiently 
responsive, and can 
corruption bë tamed? 
Scenario 3: 
Transforming 
communities 
Labour intensive local 
development, plus work 
sharing. But how to maintain 
standard of living? And is it 
really feasible? 
Respect intrinsic value of 
nature. Overriding priority 
given to avoidance of health 
risks. But dilemma of 
technological immobilization? 
More community 
provision/preventati ve health. 
But slowdown of 
technological innovation. And 
will people take responsibility 
for themselves and others? 
Rediscovery of local 
distinctiveness but how to 
respect multiple identities and 
personal freedoms? 
Stress on participatory 
democracy and local control. 
But how to coordinate 
internationally, prevent 
fragmentation and free riders? 
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3. BACKGROUND ANALYSIS: 
CRITICAL DIMENSIONS 
FOR EUROPE'S PROGRESS 
TOWARDS 
SUSTAINABILITY: 
1970-1995-2020 
3.1. Introduction to the 
background analysis 
This Annex is designed to provide analytical support 
for the three scenarios contained in Section 2. The 
Annex contains three parts: a review of framework 
issues (economic, social pol i t ical and environmen-
tal questions); a review of four key sectors (agricul-
ture, energy, industry and transport); and a summary 
of two cross-cutting issues (the urban environment 
and consumption patterns). 
The Annex focuses on the dr iv ing forces and con-
cerns shaping Europe's prospects for sustainable 
development. It therefore does not contain a fu l l -
scale assessment of the state of Europe's environ-
ment, or present forecasts for particular environ-
mental problems. Much useful addit ional informa-
t ion on these themes can be obtained in Europe's 
Environment (EEA 1995a), Environment in the Euro-
pean Union 1995 (EEA 1995b) and the Commis-
sion's review of the fifth environment action pro-
gramme (CEC 1996c). 
For ease of reference, paragraphs are numbered for 
comparison w i th the scenarios in Section 2. 
The Forum has identif ied 12 principles of sustain-
able development (see Box 1). 
Box 1 — 12 principles of sustainable 
development 
A global agenda 
1. Sustainable development cannot be achieved in 
isolation from the rest of the world. Policies for 
trade, economic and social development aid 
and'environmental protection should be consid-
ered in the context of the international implica-
tions for both Europe and developing countries. 
2. Policies and patterns of development, produc-
tion and consumption should recognize the 
population issue, in Europe as well as the rest of 
the world, and move towards being sustainable 
in the light of the projections for growth in 
population worldwide. 
Limits to traditional growth patterns 
3. The integrity of natural systems — soil, water, air 
and biological diversity — should be preserved, 
and where possible, restored. 
4. Economic and social development should re-
spect the physical limits that exist for resource 
use and regeneration. 
Equity and cost internalization 
5. The benefits and burdens of policies should be 
shared equitably by all segments of society. 
Where serious inequalities are unavoidable, 
some form of compensation should be consid-
ered. 
6. Policies should have clear objectives and be 
based on detailed assessment of the issues and 
related risks, assessment of the impact, sound 
science and sensible balance between costs and 
benefits leading to full internalization of all 
costs. 
7. Economic and social development, environ-
mental protection and social equity are interde-
pendent and all policies which should be tested 
for their impact on each area are not considered 
in isolation. 
8. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of scientific certainty should not 
be used as a reason for postponing precaution-
ary measure which are cost effective and which 
have merits in their own right. 
A shared responsibility 
9. Decisions affecting sustainable development are 
a shared responsibility. They should be open 
and based on informed participation by affected 
and interested parties. A personal sense of re-
sponsibility and involvement should be pro-
moted amongst all sectors of society. This re-
quires a knowledgeable public, a free flow of 
information and fair and equitable opportunities 
for review and redress. 
10. In addition to appropriate regulatory measures, a 
mix of market-based instruments, including fis-
cal and economic incentives and a flexible 
approach should be used to harness private 
energies and capital to promote sustainable de-
velopment. The contribution which individuals 
and society as a whole can make on a voluntary 
basis should be encouraged. 
The nature of the challenge 
11. One key to success wil l be a willingness to 
experiment. Given that some solutions wil l re-
quire fundamental changes to the status quo and 
accepted practices, policies should be intro-
duced — where possible — on a phased basis, 
to minimize the inequalities between winners 
and losers. 
12. The central challenge for Europe wil l be to 
maintain international competitiveness during 
the transition toward a more environmentally 
friendly and sustainable economy. 
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3.2. Framework of cross-
cutting issues 
3.2.1. The economic dimension 
Economic growth 
[1] The annual monetary output of the global 
economy almost doubled to USD 20 trillion 
(USD 20 000 000 000 000) between 1970 and 
1994. However, rising world population meant 
that average per capita income grew by only a 
half to USD 3 500. Of this USD 20 trillion, 
three-quarters was accounted for by the high 
income economies of Western Europe, North 
America and Japan {Vital Signs, Worldwatch, 
1996). 
[2] The European Union is currently the world's 
largest economic bloc, accounting for about a 
quarter of world GDP (Eurostat 1995). The EU's 
average per capita income now stands at 
ECU 15 944, lower than both the USA 
(ECU 20 972) and Japan (ECU 29 014), but five 
times the world average. 
[3] Although growth projections are notoriously 
unreliable, the World Bank has estimated that 
by 2030, world GDP could rise to about 
USD 69 trillion, with the Asia-Pacific region 
growing fastest from about USD 1 trillion to 
nearly USD 10 trillion. Despite slower pro-
jected growth rates, income in the rich world 
would still more than double by 2030, accord-
ing to the World Bank (World Bank, 1992). 
[4] Rapid growth in China has been the subject of 
much attention in recent years. If China's 
economy expands at 10% in 1995 as projected, 
then it will be the fourth consecutive year of 
double-digit growth, leading to an overall ex-
pansion of some 56% over just four years {Vital 
Signs, ibid.). Observers in the IMF and the 
World Bank now believe that in terms of pur-
chasing power parities, the Chinese economy is 
similar in size to Japan. Extrapolations of recent 
growth rates have led to forecasts, of China 
becoming the world's biggest economy in a 
generation's time (CEC 1995a). 
[5] More broadly, there is growing recognition that 
GDP is an inadequate indicator for steering 
economies towards sustainability, failing to ex-
press a comprehensive picture of human wel-
fare or accounting for the environmental costs 
of growth. Additional satellite accounts have 
been prepared, along with alternative compos-
ite indices, notably UNDP's Human Develop-
ment Index and Herman Daly's Index of Sus-
tainable Economic Welfare. The latter shows a 
marked decoupling of growth and welfare since 
1970 in the USA, Germany and the UK, largely 
due to rising inequality (OECD, 1995; UNDP, 
1996; FOEE, 1995). 
Box 2 — The limits to growth? 
Sustainable development, as defined by the Brundt-
land Report, is based on the assertion that a new era 
of growth is needed to tackle global poverty, and that 
to be sustainable there must be a change in the 
content of growth 'to make it less material- and 
energy-intensive and more equitable in its impact' 
(WCED, 1987). As a result, the challenge is to 
continuously improve technology, institutions and 
human capacity to manage the natural environment 
more efficiently and fairly. This countered the view 
expressed in 1972 in The limits to growth, that there 
are absolute constraints to economic expansion, 
population growth, pollution generation and re-
source depletion and that these would be reached 
'within the next 100 years' if present trends contin-
ued (Meadows, et al., 1972). Others had also argued 
that only through a 'steady-state' economy could 
environmental sustainability be achieved (Daly 
1970). 
Simple extrapolations of growth and environmental 
degradation can lead to some bleak forecasts for the 
future. Thus, the World Bank recognizes that 'if 
environmental pollution and degradation were to 
rise in step with such a rise in output, the result 
would be appalling environmental damage ... fortu-
nately such a rise need not occur nor will it if sound 
policies and strong institutional arrangements are put 
in place' (World Bank, ibid.). Similarly, Gro Harlem 
Brundtland has argued that 'it is simply impossible 
for the world as a whole to sustain a Western level of 
consumption for all. In fact, if seven billion people 
were to consume as much energy and resources as 
we do in the West today we would need 10 worlds 
not one to satisfy our needs' (Oslo I 1994). 
The European Commission argues that 'there is no 
simple linear relationship between economic growth 
and pressure on the environment', but cautions that 
'there is nothing automatic about such a move 
towards environmentally sustainable development', 
necessitating a robust policy framework relying more 
than in the past on market based instruments (CEC, 
1994a). 
Hard choices and structural changes in production 
and consumption patterns may be needed to guar-
antee that future growth does not accelerate environ-
mental decline. The Factor 10 Club of academics, 
policy-makers and business executives concluded 
that 'in industrialized countries, the current resource 
productivity must be increased' by a Factor of 10 
during the next 30 to 50 years as a prerequisite for 
meeting the goal of long-term global sustainability' 
(Factor 10,1994). If improvements of this order are to 
be achieved then where economic growth and envi-
ronmental sustainability conflict 'it will become nec-
essary to put sustainability first' (Oslo II 1995). 
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Recently, arguments about the environmental limits 
to growth have re-emerged as part of the 'Towards a 
sustainable Europe' campaign initiated by Friends of 
the Earth Europe. In this view, 'environmental space' 
is built on two pillars: first, that the amount of 
pollution and resources that can be used without 
impinging on the access of future generations is 'by 
definition limited and partially quantifiable'; and 
second, that each country has a right to the same 
amount of environmental space per capita (Milieude-
fensie, 1992). Indeed, 'Towards a sustainable Europe' 
argued that growth cannot be wholly de-coupled 
from resource use and pollution, necessitating a shift 
to a 'steady-state' economy, constrained by the intro-
duction of an absolute 'ceiling' on the use of envi-
ronmental resources (FOEE 1995). Full circle in al-
most 25 years ... 
(ISEW), which adjusts GNP to account for in-
come inequality, unpaid household work, 
spending to offset environmental costs, esti-
mates of environmental damage and deprecia-
tion of natural capital. In the UK, this has meant 
that while the UK's GNP per capita has grown 
2.3 times between 1950 and 1990, the ISEW 
has been falling since the mid-1970s and by 
1990 was almost back to the 1950 level: in 
other words, there has been no real growth in 
overall welfare due to increasing inequality and 
environmental damage. 
(B) Developing a basket of indicators 
Indicators 
Measuring sustainable development 
[6] Different visions of sustainable development 
use different yardsticks to evaluate success and 
failure. At the national level, there is increasing 
recognition that the traditional indicators by 
which governments, businesses and civil soci-
ety have measured economic development 
progress have failed to account for the environ-
mental and social costs of development. In 
particular, standard national income accounts 
provide no sense of whether changes in gross 
domestic or gross national product (GDP/GNP) 
are sustainable or whether growth has been 
gained through the depletion of renewable or 
non-renewable resources, or at the cost of en-
vironmental pollution or degradation that wil l 
have to be cleaned up later. To remedy this, two 
broad approaches have been taken. 
[8] Another approach is to argue that sustainable 
development is too complex to be reduced to a 
single measure such as GNP growth or a com-
posite index such as the HDI or ISEW. Instead, 
baskets of social and environmental indicators 
can be developed to broaden the information 
used to make decisions for sustainable develop-
ment. At the international level, the UN Com-
mission on Sustainable Development has devel-
oped a set of 112 indicators, while the OECD 
regularly publishes a set of environmental indi-
cators. Some of the most interesting work in the 
development of SD indicators has, however, 
taken place at the local level, where cities such 
as Seattle in the US have involved their citizens 
in participatory exercises to find indicators 
which resonate with their own sense of sustain-
ability (for example, choosing the number of 
salmon in a local river as an indicator of water 
quality). 
Trade 
(A) Reforming national income accounts 
[7] A number of initiatives are now under way at 
the international level to reform conventional 
national income accounts to incorporate the 
social and environmental dimensions of sus-
tainable development. Since 1990, the United 
Nations Development Programme has pro-
duced annual reports using a composite human 
development index (HDI), bringing together a 
country's life expectancy, educational attain-
ment and standard of living statistics indicators, 
which shows that countries with low growth do 
not necessarily have low human development 
and vice versa. A similar approach is adopted by 
the index of sustainable economic welfare 
[9] International merchandise trade stood at over 
USD 4.2 trillion, more than tripling in value 
since 1970. In fact, trade growth is now outpac-
ing the expansion of the world economy as a 
whole by a factor of three. Trade in services, 
now worth over USD 1 trillion is also growing 
rapidly (Worldwatch, 1993). The EU is the 
world's largest trading bloc, making up 21.5% 
of total world trade (imports and exports), ex-
• eluding intra-Community trade, compared with 
18% and 10% for the USA and Japan respec-
tively. The EU's share of world trade continues 
to rise, climbing 2% between 1990 and 1993. 
The EU also imports over three times more from 
least-developed countries (LDC) than does the 
United States, and twice as much as the other 
G 7 partners put together. 
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[10] The world trade system has become progres-
sively more liberal since 1970, notably follow-
ing the GATT Uruguay Round, concluded in 
Marrakesh in April 1994 with the establish-
ment of the new World Trade Organization 
(WTO). But major barriers and distortions re-
main, notably for agriculture, textiles and serv-
ices. It is estimated that developing countries 
lose some USD 100 billion annually in agri-
cultural sales as a result of quotas, tariffs and 
other trade barriers (Worldwatch, 1993). The 
'dumping' of agricultural surpluses on world 
markets by the EU and other developed coun-
tries will be partially curbed as a result of the 
Uruguay Round by limitations imposed on 
export subsidies; the Multifibre Arrangement 
on clothing and textiles will be phased out by 
2005. 
[11 ] Looking ahead, a number of competing visions 
for world trade emerge, which will be reflected 
in the WTO's first ministerial summit in De-
cember 1996 in Singapore. 
[12] (a) Global free trade: Building on the growth 
of regional trade agreements, a leap could be 
made to a global free trade system by 2020. 
The EU has already completed its single mar-
ket and intends to expand to include perhaps 
up to 15 Central and Eastern European and 
Mediterranean countries. The EU has also 
agreed to establish a Euro-Mediterranean free 
trade zone by 2010. Elsewhere, the 18 coun-
tries of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Agreement have committed to free trade and 
investment in the region by 2010 for high-
income countries and 2020 for the rest, while 
34 countries in the western hemisphere have 
agreed to set up a Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA) by 2005, building on the 
existing North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). Other smaller regional trade agree-
ments include the ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA) and Mercosur in Latin America (Berg-
sten, 1996; Wolf, 1996). A global free trade 
regime for goods and services would be bol-
stered by agreements on investment and com-
petition, as proposed by the EC. 
[13] (b) Managing global trade: UNCED con-
cluded on the need to make trade, environ-
ment and development mutually compatible 
and reinforcing. This involves global recogni-
tion of core labour standards as proposed by 
the EU, France and the USA, and efforts to 
reconcile trade and environment policies, as 
suggested in the Commission's recent commu-
nication (CEQ1996). In the future, action 
could also be taken to address those environ-
mental aspects of trade which clearly fall 
outside national control, such as international 
transport, and work towards a more explicit 
balancing of trade and environment policies 
through the establishment of a panel on trade, 
environment and sustainable development, 
perhaps as a precursor to a global environ-
mental organization acting as a 'green' coun-
terweight to the WTO (Esty, 1994). 
[14] (c) Fair and sustainable trade: Criticisms of 
globalization' and free trade are mounting 
(Nader, et al., 1993). Trade liberalization en-
courages a 'race to the bottom' in terms of 
social and environmental standards, and al-
lows countries to draw unsustainably and un-
fairly on the environmental resources of dis-
tant countries, creating 'ecological footprints' 
in the process (Hines and Lang, 1993; Rees, 
1992). Greater reliance on domestic resources 
is required for sustainable development: thus, 
the sustainable Europe campaign argues that 
there should be a 50% reduction in Europe's 
net use of overseas agricultural land by 2010, 
with a ban on the import of agricultural fodder 
(FOEE, 1995 and 1996). International trade 
should also be organized more explicitly to 
achieve social and environmental goals, for 
example, through International Commodity 
Related Environmental Agreements (ICREAs), 
which would provide trade preferences to 
goods exceeding critical norms, replacing the 
EU's existing trade regime through the Lomé 
Convention and the generalized system of 
preferences (de Vries and Kox, 1995). 
Financial flows 
[15] Cross-border capital flows are now expanding 
more rapidly than trade flows, which in turn 
have been growing faster than world output. 
Over USD 1.5 trillion crosses international 
frontiers every 24 hours on the currency mar-
kets of which less than 5% is financing trade. 
Looking at the North-South balance, private 
capital flows have now recovered from the 
mid-1980s slump brought on by the debt 
crisis, which led to a virtual halt in new bank 
lending to the South. They now outstrip public 
finance in the form of aid and loans. Thus, in 
1994 official development assistance ac-
counted for USD 59 billion and private flows 
for USD 110 billion (OECD, 1996). Estimates 
for 1995 suggest that private capital flows 
reached a record USD 200 billion. 
[16] Over 80% of private foreign direct investment 
to the developing world is directed to just 10 
countries, all in Asia and Latin America. China 
alone accounted for USD 27.5 billion in 1993. 
Nevertheless, the external debt burden of de-
veloping countries has grown nine times since 
1970 to USD 1 945 billion, with debt service 
amounting to USD 199 billion, more than 
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double the total flows of development assist-
ance. Sub-Saharan Africa is particularly badly 
affected from a continuing lack of private 
finance. Its debt burden is more than 10% of 
Africa's annual output of goods and services 
{Vital Signs, ibid.). 
[17] Since the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992 
(UNCED) industrialized countries have not 
increased development assistance to support 
sustainable development in the South. The 
UNCED secretariat had estimated that a quar-
ter of the total USD 600 billion required each 
year in public expenditure in developing 
countries to implement the Agenda 21 action 
programme should come in the form of con-
cessional funding from the North. At USD 125 
billion this would have been more than double 
aid flows in 1992 of USD 61 billion. In reality, 
aid flows have declined since then as a result 
of fiscal retrenchment in the North. They now 
stand at perhaps the lowest level in real terms 
for 20 years. Eight EU Member States now 
provide less aid than in 1992, although aid 
from the EC itself has grown slightly, largely 
due to multiannual financing agreements. The 
drive to low deficit or balanced budgets in 
both the EU and the USA is likely to ensure 
that public aid flows will continue to stay flat 
or decline further in the foreseeable future. 
[18] New financial instruments are being proposed 
as a way of overcoming constraints to tradi-
tional aid finance, including demilitarization 
funds, pollution taxes and taxing foreign ex-
change speculation, thus, putting a price on 
scarce 'environmental space' (such as a global 
cap on greenhouse gas emissions) could lead 
to a very significant transfer of resources from 
rich to poor nations, as industrial polluters 
who currently emit the most buy permits from 
the developing world. Some estimates suggest 
USD 500 billion to USD 1 trillion could be 
raised in this way each year (UNDP, 1994). A 
solution which would require less consensus 
at a global level would be the spread of 'joint 
implementation' projects for global conven-
tions (starting with climate), which could ac-
celerate investments in developing countries 
while cutting pollution (Heller, 1996). The 
idea of taxing foreign currency flows, first 
proposed by Nobel Laureate James Tobin in 
1978, has been revived, notably by the late 
French President François Mitterand at the 
1994 Copenhagen Social Summit. Some ana-
lysts argue that a 0.5% tax could raise global 
revenues of USD 1.5 trillion each year (UNDP, 
1994). 
[19] There is also growing experimentation with 
local currency schemes to enable communi-
ties to mobilize new resources for develop-
ment. Over 300 communities in Europe are 
using local exchange trading systems (LETs), 
which provide a computer-based system for 
facilitating trade, using either the national unit 
or time as the unit of measurement (Douth-
waite, 1996). Others are proposing different 
services (CEC, 1993a; Europe 99, 1993). 
3.2.2. The social dimension 
Population 
[20] World population grew from 3.7 billion in 
1970 to 5.7 billion in 1995, and continues to 
expand by some 87 million each year, al-
though the growth rate is slowly declining 
(ICPQL, 1996). The EU's population stood at 
370 million in 1994, approximately 6.5% of 
total world population, down from about 9.5% 
in 1970 (Eurostat, ibid.). Births per woman in 
the EU, at approximately 1.4, are at an all time 
low. At present the equivalent of the EU's 
population is added to the world total every 4 
years and 3 months. Looking ahead 20 years, 
UN population projections range from a low 
of 7.10 billion people in 2015 to a high of 7.83 
billion, a difference of some 720 million 
(UNFPA, 1996). All but 1 % of future popula-
tion growth will be concentrated in today's 
developing countries, and no less than two 
thirds of this wil l occur in two regions, Africa 
and South Asia (ICPQL, 1996). For the EU, 
Eurostat estimates that by 2020, the current EU 
could hold only 5% of the world's people, 
with a low scenario of 360 million (fewer than 
today) and a high scenario of 422 million 
people. 
[21] One consequence of this growth in population 
wil l be an expansion of the'global workforce· 
from 2.5 billion to 3.7 billion people (Interna-
tional Labour Organization — ILO). However, 
neither the developed or developing countries 
have been able to create jobs in line with 
either economic or population growth: thus, 
while the global economy will have doubled 
in size between 1975 and 2000, employment 
growth wil l have increased by less than half 
(UNDP, 1993). In the EU, over the past dec-
ade, unemployment levels have remained 
high between 8 and 11 % of the workforce. As 
part of the Delors White Paper on growth, 
competitiveness and employment, the Euro-
pean Commission suggested a target of creat-
ing 15 million jobs by 2000, and has subse-
quently proposed a European pact of confi-
dence for employment (CEC, 1993a; CEC, 
. 1996b). 
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[22] The world population is also ageing, with the 
most rapid changes occurring in the develop-
ing world, where the population over 65 may 
quadruple over the next 30 years to around 1.2 
billion (WRI, ibid.). In the EU itself, the pro-
portion of inhabitants under 20 has fallen from 
a third to under a quarter between 1970 and 
1995, while the proportion over 60 has grown 
from 17.5 to 20.4%. These trends are pro-
jected to continue so that by 2020, older 
people in the Union will account for 25% of 
the total and young people will fall to 21.6% 
(Eurostat, ibid.). 
Box 3 — The Mediterranean context 
On its southern shores, the EU's demographic pic-
ture is reversed. While its population has grown only 
slowly, the population of the southern and eastern 
Mediterranean countries has almost doubled since 
1970 to some 200 million and is projected to reach 
345 million by 2025 (CEC, 1994). Furthermore, the 
proportion of young people under 20 is double that 
in the EU, standing at 50% in Egypt and Morocco 
and 53% in Algeria. Slow growth in relation to a 
rising population has meant that income per capita 
has fallen as a proportion of the EU average from 
26% in 1960 to 23% in 1990, resulting in insufficient 
job opportunities for an expanding pool of labour 
and a rise in poverty (CEC, 1994b). 
[23] Migration is now a global phenomenon, with 
perhaps over 100 million international immi-
grants of all kinds. In Europe, there is growing 
concern about the pressures about mounting 
immigration pressures, particularly about the 
way in which large migration in-flows are 
providing opportunities for extreme nationalist 
parties. In addition, 'illegal migration from 
South to North and from East to West is the ' 
main threat to security, having replaced the 
risk of a military conflict' (Montanari & 
Cortese, 1993). Most European governments 
have responded by tightening immigration 
controls, but there is uncertainty about how 
difficult it will be to police Europe's external 
frontiers (Northcott, 1996). While support for 
development in countries of high population 
growth may reduce migration pressures at 
source to some degree, it is likely that a certain 
amount of further migration from South to 
North could be necessary to solve the problem 
of excessive manpower. 
Poverty and inequality 
[24] The Brundtland Report gave priority to 'the 
essential needs of the world's poor, to which 
over-riding priority should be given' (WCED, 
1987). But, despite a doubling in total global 
income, the numbers of people worldwide 
living in poverty has continued to rise over the 
past three decades from 944 million in 1970 to 
1.3 billion in 1994 (ICPQL, ibid.): 905 million 
adults remain illiterate, and 120 million chil-
dren do not go to primary school. 1 000 mil-
lion people do not have basic health services. 
1.3 billion do not have clean water. 1.9 billion 
are without rudimentary sanitation. 780 mil-
lion are chronically undernourished. 120 mil-
lion people are officially unemployed, and a 
further 600-700 million are under-employed. 
[25] Inequality between rich and poor more 
broadly has also widened, both within and 
between countries. The poorest 20% of the 
world's population have seen their share of 
global income decline from 2.3 to 1.4% over 
the past three decades, while the richest 20% 
have increased their share from 70 to 85%. 
Rapid growth in about 15 countries, benefiting 
some 1.5 billion people mostly in Asia, has 
largely obscured actual regression elsewhere. 
Indeed, the incomes of about 1.6 billion peo-
ple are now lower now than in 1980, due to 
economic decline or stagnation, mostly in 
Latin America, Eastern Europe, Sub-Saharan 
African, the Arab world, as well as parts of Asia 
and the OECD; average incomes in 43 coun-
tries have now fallen below those 25 years ago 
in 1970 (UNDP, 1996). If present trends are 
allowed to continue they will produce 'a 
world gargantuan in its excesses and grotesque 
in its human and economic inequalities' 
(UNDP). The least developed countries will 
slip further behind, while East Asia catches up 
with OECD levels. 
Gender 
[26] Gender disparities between men and women 
are still large in political, economic and social 
terms, despite much progress in Europe and 
worldwide since 1970. For example, wom-
en's literacy increased from 54% of the male 
rate in 1970 to 74% in 1990 (UNDP, 1995). 
But in no society do women enjoy the same 
opportunities as men. Thus 70% of the world's 
poor are women, while only 10% of parlia-
mentary seats worldwide are held by women. 
Women's health care needs also suffer ne-
glect, and nearly half a million maternal 
deaths occur each year in developing coun-
tries. Although the principle of equal pay for 
equal work is enforced through legislation 
within the EU, women normally receive a 
much lower average wage then men. Further-
more, much of women's work is still unpaid: 
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the UNDP has estimated that if all unpaid 
activities were charged at market rates then 
they would be equivalent to USD 16 billion 
annually, equivalent to some 70% of global 
monetary output. 
Box 4 — Relaunching the North-South 
agenda 
To relaunch the flagging development agenda, the 
Development Assistance Committee of the OECD 
has proposed the following 'ambitious but realiz-
able goals' for shaping the 21st century (OECD, 
1996): 
• A reduction by one-half in the proportion of 
people living in extreme poverty by 2015; 
• Universal primary education in all countries by 
2.015; 
• Demonstrated progress towards gender equality 
and the empowerment of women by eliminating 
disparities in primary and secondary education 
by 2005; 
• A reduction by two thirds in the infant mortality 
rates and a reduction by three quarters in ma-
ternal mortality, all by 2015; 
• Access through the primary health-care system to 
reproductive health services for all individuals as 
soon as possible and no later than 2015; 
• Implementation of national strategies for sustain-
able development by 2005, to ensure that cur-
rent trends in the loss of environmental resources 
— forests, fisheries, freshwater, climate, soils, 
biodiversity, stratospheric ozone, hazardous sub-
stances — are effectively reversed at both global 
and national levels by 2015. 
3.2.3. The political and institutional 
dimension 
Global governance 
[27] The world political system has undergone 
revolutionary changes, perhaps most notably 
the collapse of centrally-planned communism 
in the former Soviet Union and Central and 
Eastern Europe. The last fragments of European 
colonialism are disappearing, notably with the 
fall of the apartheid regime in South Africa and 
the transfer of Hong Kong to China in 1997. 
The era of Third World commodity power has 
come and gone, but new regions have risen to 
global prominence, notably the countries of 
East Asia. 
[28] But the potential changes may offer for a more 
cohesive approach to global governance has 
not yet been realized. The United Nations 
system is in crisis, facing huge financial prob-
lems, with a deficit of USD 3.25 billion, of 
which USD 1.3 billion is owed by the USA. 
The UN also faces an urgent need to reform 
itself to respond to new challenges to world 
security, and the rise of rival decision-making 
bodies at the global and regional levels, nota-
bly the Group of 7 club of rich nations, first 
established in 1975. As UNCED demonstrated, 
the exclusive nature of government-to-govern-
ment diplomacy is under challenge as new 
actors rise to prominence in global affairs, 
notably multinational corporations and non-
governmental organisations. 
[29] The Commission on Global Governance, 
chaired by Ingvar Carlsson, has proposed a 
number of reforms to reform international re-
lations, including: 
• Ethics: A global civil ethic is needed to 
underpin a common commitment to core 
values; 
• Security: The conception of security should 
be broadened from State interest to that of 
people and the planet, with a new right of 
petition by non-State actors to bring situa-
tions endangering people to the attention of 
the Security Council; 
• Economics: An Economic Security Council 
should be formed to provide global leader-
ship that would be more representative than 
the G-7 and the Bretton Woods Institutions 
and more effective than the UN. 
• UN Reform: Replacing the existing perma-
nent members (Britain, China, France, Rus-
sia and the USA> with a panel of five 
members, two from the industrialized 
world and one each from Africa, Asia and 
Latin America. Also introducing an annual 
Forum of Civil Society alongside the Gen-
eral Assembly representing States (CGG, 
1995). 
Box 5 — Competing scenarios of global 
governance 
In 1995, the Group of Lisbon, bringing together 19 
international thinkers, produced a wide-ranging 
analysis of future trends in a globalizing world. 
They were highly critical of trends they saw as 
leading to a world dominated by a new ideology of 
competitiveness. The future was viewed along two 
alternative axes: first, the degree of global govern-
ance by either the market or cooperative mecha-
nisms; and second, the intensity of global integra-
tion set against tendencies for localism and frag-
mentation (Lisbon, 1993). From this, six competing 
scenarios of the world in 2010 were produced, the 
first three driven by fragmentation and the next 
three by integration: 
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1. Apartheid: The highly developed regions and 
countries effectively de-link from the rest of the 
world, setting up an economic and cultural wall 
between rich and poor. Prosperity will drive 
from de-materialized growth and new informa-
tion infrastructures, and policy will be driven by 
the need to develop national pacts between 
businesses, labour and governments to achieve 
international competitiveness. (The participants 
thought there was a low degree of probability to 
this outcome.) 
2. Survival: Global fragmentation takes place in a 
context of a privatized and deregulated market 
economy, and each enterprise, city, region' and 
social group focuses on survival and the pro-
motion of self-interest through zero-sum com-
petition. (The participants thought this scenario 
was largely unfolding, with a fairly high prob-
ability of becoming dominant in 20 years.) 
3. Pax Triadica: The global order fragments, but 
within a relatively stable regime controlled by 
the rich triad of North America, Europe and 
East Asia. A tacit and explicit consensus will 
exist among the triad to co-govern the world 
to ensure political stability and socioeconomic 
development. Cold War competition between 
blocs will be replaced by mobilization of 
science and technology for civilian applications 
and limited trade wars. (The participants 
thought many of the elements for this scenario 
were already at work, for instance, the G7.) 
4. Sustainable global integration: Principles of 
global commons, human solidarity, wealth 
sharing, social and environmental accountabil-
ity, dialogue of cultures are translated into 
daily life at the company, city, national and 
international levels. Global problems require 
new rules and institutions. The imperative of 
the free market is replaced by the imperative 
of a socially and environmentally accountable 
cooperative economy (The participants thought 
the probability of this scenario occurring in the 
next 20 years was extremely low). 
5. Regionalized global system: An integrated 
world economy is based on two-tiered coop-
eration, through regional trade agreements (e.g. 
EU, NAFTA, APEC, Euro-Med, Mercosur, etc.) 
and planetary coordination amongst these re-
gions: this will lead to a reorganization of the 
UN system. (The participants thought the world 
was moving in this direction as far as regional 
integration is concerned, but the UN structures 
have yet to adjust.) 
6. Gattist: A single integrated economy is estab-
lished at the global level, mirroring the EU's 
common market, and mirroring the full reali-
. zation of the principles of GATT and the WTO. 
There will be free circulation of goods, serv-
ices, capital and people, and a radical shake-
up of present national and regional banking, 
insurance, monetary, fiscal, agriculture and 
competition policies. (The participants thought 
this was rather unlikely within the next 20 
years.) 
European governance 
[30] At the European level, the European Eco-
nomic Communi ty has been transformed 
since 1970 from a l imited free trade zone of 
6 Member States to a 15 member European 
Union, w i th a comprehensive mandate and 
increasingly complex institutional structures. 
Further enlargement to the East and South is 
projected for the years ahead, including the 
Associated Countries of Poland, Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Bul-
garia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Slovenia, 
along wi th Cyprus and Malta. The 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference is aimed at 
reforming the current EU structures to make 
them more effective and bring them closer to 
EU citizens. 
[31] Strengthening environmental pol icy is one 
way in wh ich the Union could better respond 
to the 'pressure being brought by publ ic op in -
ion for greater respect for the limits imposed 
by the environment and sustainable develop-
ment' (Reflex, 1995). The Commission has 
suggested that this goal could be achieved in 
two ways: stressing the cit izen's right to a 
healthy environment, and integrating environ-
mental requirements into other parts of the 
Treaty (CEC, 1996d). The European Parliament 
has gone further, urging the inclusion of envi -
ronmental objectives as part of the mission of 
the Union, cal l ing for environmental protec-
t ion requirements to be given priority over the 
principle of free movement of goods and free-
dom of imports, and stressing the right of 
Member States to introduce more stringent 
national standards (EP,1996). A coal i t ion of six 
environmental organizations has called for 
sustainable development to be made the para-
mount objective of the Union, for the environ-
ment to be integrated into all other pol icy 
areas and for the democratic deficit to be 
removed from the EU's institutional structure 
(CNE, EEB, T&E, FOEE, Greenpeace Interna-
t ional, WWF, 1995). 
Box 6 — The Consultative Forum and the 
Intergovernmental Conference 
The Forum stated that the environmental dimension 
should lie at the very core of the evolution of the 
European Union and that making clear that sus-
tainable development is one of the main objectives 
of the Union is an obligation that follows from 
these commitments. The Forum put forward 
amendments to the text of the treaty of the Single 
European Act. 
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3.2.4. The environmental dimension 
[32] Global environmental action has been trans-
formed since 1970 from almost non-existence 
to an increasingly extensive system of soft and 
hard law, reflected in over 100 international 
environmental agreements, institutional 
change within the UN and Bretton Woods 
system and numerous action plans, most no-
tably Agenda 21 agreed at the second world 
summit on environment and development at 
Rio in June 1992. Nevertheless, these actions 
have not yet managed to change significantly 
the course of key economic and social trends 
that continue to lead towards long-term unsus-
tainability. Thus, the preamble to Agenda 21 
states that: 'we are confronted with a perpetu-
ation of disparities between and within na-
tions, a worsening of poverty, hunger, i l l -
health and illiteracy and the continuing dete-
rioration of the ecosystems on which we de-
pend for our well-being' (UNCED, 1992). 
[33] The EU has become an important driver of 
environmental policy both for its Member 
States and internationally. Over the past 20 
years, over 200 binding pieces of environmen-
tal legislation have been agreed at the EU 
level. More recently, the fifth environmental 
action programme represents a significant evo-
lution in recent years towards a more strategic 
approach to promoting the environmental di-
mension as part of overall sustainable devel-
opment for the Union, focusing on target 
sectors, key environmental themes and a 
broadening of the range of policy instruments 
(CEC, 1993a). 
[34] Nevertheless, the European Environment 
Agency's 1995 Review of the fifth programme 
concluded that 'without accelerated policies, 
pressures on the environment wil l continue to 
exceed human health standards and often 
limited carrying capacity of the environment. 
Actions taken to date will not lead to full 
integration of environmental considerations in 
economic sectors or to sustainable develop-
ment' (EEA, 1995). Since the late 1980s, a 
number of attempts have been made to grap-
ple with long-term trends in Europe, and sug-
gest the consequences of taking the necessary 
action to achieve sustainable development. 
These include: 
[35] A. The European common garden (1992): As 
part of the East-West Interparliamentary Meet-
ing in May 1992, RIVM prepared two contrast-
ing scenarios of the pan-European environ-
ment in 2010, first an extrapolation of current 
trends (GLOBE I) and second, a full implemen-
tation of best available technologies (GLOBE 
II) (Sesimbra, 1993). The scenarios model dif-
ferent environmental outcomes against a back-
drop of forecasts for global and regional eco-
nomic growth, population, energy consump-
tion, transport and land use, and produce 
estimates of the costs of different environmen-
tal options. Forecasts were produced for a 
range of conventional environmental issues, 
such as climate change, ozone depletion, low-
level smog, radioactivity, acidification, pollu-
tion of soil and groundwater, rivers and seas, 
health and ecosystems. Although GLOBE II 
demonstrates that cost-effective environmental 
improvements can be made within the existing 
growth-oriented economic model, it does not, 
however, guarantee 'sustainability'. For exam-
ple, GLOBE II leads to reduced carbon dioxide 
emissions of about 10%, but does not achieve 
the Toronto goals for climate change of a 20% 
cut by 2000. 
[36] B. Benefits of integration (1994): A consortium 
of research organizations was contracted by 
the European Commission to assess the eco-
nomic impact of the fifth environmental action 
programme in the existing European Union in 
2010 (DRI, et al., 1994). Three scenarios were 
established, following a similar approach to 
RIVM, modelling a projection of 'business as 
usual' trends (the REF Scenario), the imple-
mentation of policies in the pipeline (the PIP 
scenario), and the integration of environmen-
tal and economic policies, largely through 
changes in fiscal policies, on the model pre-
sented by the fifth programme (INT). Forecasts 
of economic growth and sectoral activities are 
again related to key environmental param-
eters, such as climate change, acidification, 
toxic substances, biodiversity, water quality, 
water resources, waste, the urban environment 
and coastal zones. Results similar to GLOBE II 
emerge from the RIVM exercise. The REF 
scenario not surprisingly leads to a substantial 
deterioration of the environment; the PIP sce-
nario, significant environmental benefits, but 
at a cost of lower GDP than in the REF; the INT 
reduces pressure on the environment and 
achieves slightly higher annual growth rates 
(2.2% compared with 2.15% under the REF 
and 2 . 1 % under the PIP scenarios). Again, 
however, these improvements are not suffi-
cient to achieve 'sustainability', with C0 2 
emissions under the INT scenario 5% higher in 
2010 than 1990, largely due to growing trans-
port volumes·. 
[37] C. Sustainable Europe (1996): Building on the 
'Action plan: Sustainable Netherlands, pub-
lished in 1992, Friends of the Earth Europe 
have launched a Sustainable Europe cam-
paign, which involves the creation of a pan-
European scenario for 2010 (FOEE, 1996). The 
approach taken by Friends of the Earth Europe 
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differs markedly from both the RIVM and DRI 
studies: first, no macro- or sectoral economic 
modelling is involved; and second, the sce-
nario is designed to demonstrate what is 
needed to achieve sustainability, based on the 
concept of 'environmental space'. 
Box 7 — Long-range scenarios for climate 
change policy analysis 
The International Petroleum Industry Environmental 
Conservation Association (IPIECA) held a workshop 
in early 1996 to explore the use of scenarios for 
developing policy options to address climate change 
(IPIECA, 1996). IPIECA identified a 'cycle of uncer-
tainty', comprising six components, all subject to 
varying degrees of uncertainty, which made sce-
narios a potentially useful tool for policy analysis. 
The six areas of uncertainty included: the primary 
effects of climate change; the impacts on ecosystems; 
impacts on socioeconomic systems; the policy re-
sponse; levels of greenhouse gas emissions; and 
greenhouse gas concentrations. 
The workshop found that scenarios for policy analy-
sis must be built in a fashion that allows assessment 
of the environmental and socioeconomic conse-
quences, not only of climate change, but also of 
climate change policies on factors such as economic 
growth, employment, trade, energy security, invest-
ment, tax policy and the role of national and inter-
national institutions. Although IPIECA has not devel-
oped its own set of scenarios of climate futures, it 
found that scenarios can be useful for investigating 
uncertainty and its consequences for decision-mak-
ing, using the following criteria and principles: 
• The purpose of the scenarios must be defined; 
• Scenarios should not be confused with forecasts; 
• Scenarios must address all the major elements and 
key uncertainties; 
• Scenarios must be plausible and internally consist-
ent in ways which can be validated; 
• Assumptions, component relationships and input 
values must be transparent; 
• The legitimacy and credentials of the originators 
must be apparent; 
• Outputs from scenarios must be effectively com-
municated; 
• Scenarios and models have complementary func-
tions. 
3.3. Sectoral issues 
3.3.1. Industry and technology 
[38] The European Union is the world's leading 
centre for industrial production. Although in-
dustrial production grew at a steady rate 
through the 1980s, employment fell by a fifth. 
Furthermore, with the rise of the service sector, 
industry now accounts for only a quarter of EU 
GDP (Eurostat, 1995). Structural changes in 
Europe's economy have resulted in a shift 
away from heavy industry with high rates of 
resource use and pollution to light consumer 
industries with much lower environmental im-
pacts. As a result, over the past two decades, 
the industrial sector has steadily cut its levels 
of pollution and rates of resource use: energy 
use per unit of output has fallen by about 20% 
and material use per unit has fallen by 50% 
(EEA, 1995b). Looking ahead, these trends 
appear set to continue with the office and 
electronic data-processing sub-sectors pro-
jected to benefit from fast demand growth 
during the rest of the 1990s. In general, those 
sectors known to have important damaging 
effects on the environment — such as metals, 
textiles and cement branches — are located 
towards the lower end of the growth spectrum; 
the notable exceptions are plastics, rubber, 
pulp and paper, which are likely to see above 
average growth (DRI, et al., 1994). 
[39] Europe could thus emulate the switch that has 
taken place in the USA, whereby 'information 
age' expenditure on telecommunications and 
data processing has now overtaken 'industrial 
age' spending on manufacturing equipment 
and products (IPIECA, 1996). The information 
and communications revolution could accel-
erate the general trend within advanced 
economies to use fewer resources per unit of 
output. One Optimists' scenario for 2010 thus 
suggests that there will be a 30% substitution 
of physical transport by telecommunications, 
stabilizing transport use of 2000 levels despite 
a 50% growth in world trade (Johnston and 
Pestel, 1995). More broadly, there is growing 
evidence of a possible merger between envi-
ronmental goals and technological innovation 
(Fussier, 1996). There are now growing num-
bers of examples of products which provide 
services with decisively fewer materials and 
less energy on a life cycle basis. These include 
laser printers that are more efficient per printed 
sheet by a factor of 15 than ink jets, and 
modern cars providing the same service with a 
factor of 10 less material intensity (von Weiz-
säcker, 1995). 
[40] Opinion is divided, however, on the policy 
environment required to stimulate these tech-
nological changes, and ensure that they serve 
sustainable development. One line of thinking 
argues that governments cannot impose this 
innovation or legislate for the information 
revolution. Rather they need to develop a 
framework of cooperation with businesses, 
public authorities and NGOs to develop a 
sense of common purpose linking the informa-
tion society with the goals of sustainable de-
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velopment (Johnston and Pestel, ibid.). Others 
argue that institutional constraints and vested 
interests against these positive trends remain 
formidable. One tool for tackling these bottle-
necks would be ecological tax reform to in-
crease the price of resources and consequently 
reduce the cost of labour (Schmidt-
Bleek,1996). Another is to increase the corpo-
rate accountability for the environmental per-
formance of their processes and products. This 
could involve the introduction of mandatory 
environmental management systems and re-
porting (EPE, 1996). 
3.3.2. Transport 
Trends in use and impacts 
[41] The transport services industry in the EU gen-
erated approximately 4% of the EU's GDP 
between 1980 and 1990 and employed 
roughly 4.5% of the workforce {Economist, 
1996). It also imposed heavy environmental 
and social costs on Europe, accounting for 
nearly 70% of CO, approximately 60% of 
NOx , 50% of VOCs and 10% of S02 emitted 
in the EU {Economist, 1996). European trans-
port is responsible for the deaths of 60 000 
people each year (Short, 1994) and the Euro-
pean Commission has estimated that crowded 
roads impose costs equivalent to 2% of GDP. 
The total external costs of transport are likely 
to be far higher; estimates from the USA for the 
external costs of cars range from 5.3% of GDP 
to 12% {Economist, 1996). 
[42] Hence, increasing transport efficiency and re-
ducing the negative impacts of transport wil l 
continue to be major issues in Europe far into 
the 21st century. Over the last 20 years road 
transport use, particularly the use of the private 
car, has increased far faster than any other 
mode. Passenger car use (measured in vehicle-
kilometres) approximately doubled between 
1970 and 1990 whilst goods vehicles in-
creased by 80% and buses and coaches by 
60% (Eurostat, 1995). In 1992, road transport 
in the EU 15 accounted for 79% of passenger-
kilometres (3 296 thousand million pass-km), 
70% of freight in tonnes-kilometres (DG VII) 
and the majority of transport-related pollution 
{Economist, 1996). 
[43] Governments have invested heavily in road 
networks; the length of motorways has dou-
bled over the past 20 years whilst the railway 
network has only increased by 8% (Eurostat, 
1995). By 2010 the number of cars in the EU is 
predicted to be 167 million or 503 cars per 
1 000 inhabitants, compared to 381 per 1 000 
in 1992 (CEC, 1992). In countries with a much 
lower base of car ownership — India has two 
cars per 1 000 inhabitants, China only one 
(Heierli, 1995) — demand is rising much more 
quickly. Globally the number of cars in the 
world has risen five times faster than the 
population over the last 20 years and by 2020 
it is estimated that the number of cars on the 
road will be approaching 1 billion {Economist, 
1996). 
[44] The share of final energy consumption ac-
counted for by transport in the EU rose from 
about 20% in 1970 to 30% in the early 1990s; 
over the same period industry's share has 
fallen. More than 83% of this is accounted for 
by road vehicles; although the fuel efficiency 
of vehicles has increased, the benefits have 
been offset by increasing vehicle ownership 
and use (Eurostat, 1995). 
[45] Air travel also continues to rise across the 
world, particularly in Europe, where demand 
rose 6.8% in 1995, and Asia-Pacific. Demand 
is predicted to double in volume terms by the 
year 2000 although there" are already serious 
constraints in terms of airport capacity, par-
ticularly in Europe (Commerzbank, 1996). 
[46] The transport equipment industry is one of the 
EU's principal industrial sectors, second only 
in terms of turnover, to the food industry. 
Motor vehicles account for over three quarters 
of the sector's output, followed by the aero-
space industry which accounts for 14% (CEC, 
1993). 
[47] Concern about the environmental, health and 
social impacts of increasing demand for trans-
port has grown dramatically in recent years. 
Most European countries have already intro-
duced policies which require or promote use 
of cleaner technologies and individual coun-
tries and companies as well as the EU itself 
(e.g. 'Car of tomorrow' programme) are invest-
ing in research and development. Although 
many of these policies have been successful, 
for example emissions of VOCs, NOx and CO 
are falling in some Member States due to the 
introduction of catalytic converters and energy 
efficiency per vehicle per km has increased, 
these benefits are likely to be overwhelmed by 
increasing vehicle ownership and use. 
[48] There is much research going into the devel-
opment of alternatives to the petrol driven car. 
The main focus for the future is on electric or 
hydrogen powered vehicles or hybrids, which 
supplement electrical energy stored in batter-
ies with other sources of power. The general 
consensus amongst the car industry and aca-
demics is that the internal combustion engine 
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will go on propelling most cars until at least 
2025, although battery driven electric vehi-
cles, fuel cells and hybrids will play an in-
creasingly important role {Economist, 1996). 
[49] The next 25 years are also likely to see increas-
ing use of information technology in traffic 
management. Telematics could lead to smarter 
vehicles which could react to changes in traffic 
conditions. IT could be used to reduce or 
restrict car use by measuring individual jour-
ney length and pollution emitted and charging 
accordingly {Economist, 1996). 
[50] Driving is likely to become increasingly ex-
pensive and difficult in the future. Initiatives 
which are currently in operation around the 
EU or are being considered include raising 
parking charges, charging for individual jour-
neys and the introduction of fuel and/or car-
bon taxes. Road pricing has already been 
introduced in several countries and the Neth-
erlands is planning to introduce it on key 
routes in the Randstad by 2000 {Economist, 
1996). 
Key issues 
[51] The main issues influencing attitudes towards 
policy that are likely to be important in future 
transport policy include the following. 
[52] Pollution: Local impacts from, NOx, SOx, 
VOCs, Pb and particulates. Health impacts are 
an increasing cause of concern and are lead-
ing to local action against the car in some 
places. The health impact of pollution may be 
one of the key triggers in changing attitudes 
towards cars. The contribution to greenhouse 
gas emissions from transport are a source of 
growing concern as the proportion accounted 
for by transport rises and global vehicle use 
continues to increase rapidly. This is likely to 
become an increasingly important factor in the 
transport debate. 
[53J Social effects of current transportation: There 
are different interpretations as to the social 
impacts of transport, particularly in terms of 
dependence on the car and the effect of this on 
communities, which calls for a different policy 
prescription. Most people recognize the im-
pacts of congestion but there is much debate 
about how much potential there is to increase 
efficiency and what is the best way of doing 
this. 
[54] The extent to which behaviour changes are 
needed: Should the focus be on developing an 
efficient and competitive transport system 
based on cleaner vehicles and other technical 
improvements or does a sustainable society 
require radical changes in land-use planning 
and behaviour to reduce our dependence on 
the car? 
[55] Role of government in influencing transport: 
How much of a role should government have 
in transport policy, at what level (regional, EU, 
national) and what type of policies should be 
used (incentives, regulations, economic instru-
ments, curbs on the use of vehicles). 
[56] Overall, the key dilemma is how to reconcile 
efficient and competitive transport networks 
vital for a healthy economy while reducing the 
social and environmental costs of transport. 
Options for change 
Technology and innovation 
[57] Existing and potential uses of technology range 
from developing cleaner versions of existing 
vehicles or developing alternatives to using it 
to reduce or restrict vehicle use. 
(a) Cleaner, lower emitting internal combus-
tion engines (e.g. catalytic converters, un-
leaded petrol, clean-burn engines, increas-
ing fuel efficiency). 
(b) Alternative fuels and vehicles (e.g. metha-
nol and ethanol fuelled engines, electric, 
hybrid and fuel cell powered vehicles; re-
design of vehicles — for example the use of 
composites — to reduce the power re-
quired). 
(c) Information technology (e.g. telematics, 
smart cards for road pricing, navigational 
aids). 
[58] The general consensus amongst the car indus-
try and academics appears to be that the 
internal combustion engine will go on propel-
ling most cars for at least the next 30 years, 
although alternatives such as battery driven 
electric vehicles, fuel cells and hybrids are 
likely to play an increasingly important role. 
During this period some petrol cars may be 
replaced by small electric town cars and 
around 2010, fuel cell cars becoming more 
realistic, the electric vehicle is unlikely to be 
viable before 2025 (Economist, 1996). 
Policy and institutional challenges 
[59] The policies favoured and the speed with 
which changes are brought in depend on the 
attitudes of citizens and governments, firstly 
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towards the costs and benefits of current use 
and trends in transport and secondly towards 
the extent to which technical solutions can 
lead to substantial improvements. Options in-
clude: 
(a) Increasing the cost of driving: This can be 
done by increasing fuel taxes, carbon taxes, 
road pricing, pollution charges using smart 
cards, and increasing parking charges. 
There is much interest in road pricing, 
which is being introduced in several coun-
tries. Three large cities in Norway have road 
charging systems and the Netherlands is 
planning to introduce it on key routes in the 
Randstad by 2000. 
(b) Restricting traffic use: From certain areas, 
at certain times, banning particularly pollut-
ing vehicles. Several cities already ban pet-
rol vehicles from their centres and other 
cities, towns and protected areas restrict the 
number or type of vehicles allowed into 
them at certain times. 
[60] Other options include: 
(c) Incentives/support for less polluting vehi-
cles such as cleaner vehicles, public trans-
port. 
(d) Rethinking land-use planning to reduce de-
pendence on the car. 
(e) Enhanced investment in technology and IT 
to improve efficiency. 
[62] Demand has been rising very rapidly in devel-
oping countries, trebling since 1973, but from 
a much lower base, so developing countries 
still account for less than one third of global 
energy consumption. Per capita energy use in 
most developing countries is still very low, on 
average nine times lower than in developed 
countries (WRI, 1996). 
[63] Concern about the near term adequacy of 
energy resources has decreased since the 
1970s, as estimates of energy resources have 
increased, for example proved recoverable 
reserves of natural gas rose 140% over the last 
20 years. If energy consumption were to re-
main constant at current levels it is estimated 
that proved reserves could supply world oil 
needs for 40 years, gas for 60 years and coal 
for 200 years (WRI, 1996). 
Key issues 
How much will demand increase? 
[64] All commentators agree that demand for en-
ergy is rising across the world and consump-
tion is likely to rise significantly by 202Ó 
unless radical changes are made. However, 
estimates as to the likely magnitude of growth 
vary significantly — see below. 
3.3.3. Energy 
Current energy consumption 
[61] Energy consumption has been rising for the 
last two decades and reached 326 exajoules 
(or about 157 million barrels of oil) in 1993, 
49% higher than 20 years earlier. OECD coun-
tries consumed over half of all commercial 
energy in 1993 but demand has been rising 
more slowly here than in other parts of the 
world. The EU accounts for 17% of global 
energy demand despite having only 6% of the 
global population (FOPEE, 1995). The 51 exa-
joules consumed in the EU in 1991 were 
divided fairly equally between industry (29%), 
transport (32%) and household and tertiary 
sectors (39%) (Eurostat, 1995). Oil accounted 
for 43.5% of total energy demand, solid fuels 
for 21 %, gas 18%, nuclear 13.5% and renewa-
bles for 3.5% (Eurostat, 1995). The EU is 
heavily dependent on imports from third coun-
tries, importing almost half its energy in 1993 
(Eurostat, 1995). 
Air pollution 
[65] The main cause of concern is C 0 2 emissions. 
Unless major changes are made to energy 
supply and use, C0 2 emissions are predicted 
to rise significantly in all areas of the world, 
including the EU, where most countries are 
committed to reducing them. 
Scale of resources and security of supply 
[66] There is no consensus about the scale of fossil 
fuel resources, with some people arguing that 
there are still large reserves to be discovered 
or, that as the more accessible reserves are 
depleted, it wil l become more economic to 
extract fuel from less accessible sources. Other 
commentators believe that most of the world 
reserves are now known. A few predict that oil 
production wil l peak within the next eight 
years, whilst others say that this wil l not hap-
pen until 2025. In the EU there is increasing 
concern about the security of supply as de-
pendence on imports from third, often unsta-
ble, countries increases. 
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The future fuel mix 
[67] Whilst some are content to leave this to market 
forces, others support increased use of natural 
gas on environmental grounds, whilst others 
argue that the world should be moving to-
wards a nuclear-free and fossil-fuel free future. 
The potential of renewable fuels 
[68] Whilst some see these as having little future, 
others see them as the only future for energy 
supply. Consequently while some would argue 
for large investments in R&D and support for 
their use others see this as unnecessary. There 
is also much debate about the sustainability 
and viability of the various renewables. 
The extent of potential energy efficiency 
increases 
[69] Some believe that major savings in energy use 
can be relatively easily achieved but the extent 
of this and the ease with which energy efficien-
cies can be improved in developed and devel-
oping countries is contested. 
Predictions about the future 
[70] Many organizations have developed scenarios 
for future energy consumption, including com-
panies (e.g. Shell, IEPLA), governments (e.g. 
[71] 
US), international agencies (e.g. IEA) and non-
governmental organizations (e.g. Greenpeace, 
Friends of the Earth, WEC). The World Re-
sources Institute (1996) compared three sets of 
predictions about future energy consumption, 
see table below. The World Energy Council, 
an international organization promoting the 
sustainable supply and use of energy, devel-
oped four alternative scenarios. Their refer-
ence scenario assumes that economic growth 
will be moderate and progress in improving 
energy planning, pricing and technology trans-
fer wil l be good. In the modified reference 
scenario energy efficiency improvements are 
assumed to be slower and the high growth 
scenario assumes a higher rate of economic 
growth than in the reference scenario. The 
ecologically driven scenario assumes very 
high efficiency improvements and a low in-
crease in energy demand from developing 
countries due to a massive transfer of energy 
efficient technology. 
The International Energy Agency (a sister 
organization to the OECD) scenarios assume 
the same population and economic condi-
tions, but in the capacity constraints scenario 
it is assumed that past patterns of consump-
tion will continue, whereas in the energy 
savings scenario it assumes that greater im-
provements in energy efficiency occur 
through changes in consumer behaviour. The 
US Department of Energy does not use sce-
narios but instead shows the range of sensi-
tivity of its predictions. 
Period 
Economic growth 
OECD 
Former USSR and Cen-
tral Europe 
Developing countries 
World 
% increase in energy 
consumption over pe-
riod 
% increase in C 0 2 
emissions over 1990 
levels 
WEC 
scenarios 
High 
growth 
1990-2020 
High 
2.4 
2.4 
5.6 
3.8 
98 
93 
Modified 
reference 
1990-2020 
Moderate 
2.4 
2.4 
4.6 
3.3 
84 
73 
Reference 
1990-2020 
Moderate 
2.4 
2.4 
4.6 
3.3 
54 
42 
Ecologically 
driven 
1990-2020 
Moderate 
2.4 
2.4 
4.6 
3.3 
30 
5 
IEA 
scenarios 
Capacity 
constraints 
1992-2010 
Moderate 
2.5 
2.1 
5.3 
3.1 
44 
42 
Energy 
savings 
1992-2010 
Moderate 
2.5 
2.1 
5.3 
, 3.1 
34 
30 
US Dept. 
of Energy 
Reference 
scenario 
1990-2010 
Moderate 
2.3 
0.6 
2.8-6.1 . 
(varies by 
region) 
2.7 
22-52 
26-47 
Source: WRI, 1996. 
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[72] The EU recently developed its own set of 
scenarios where three alternative views of 
the future, battlefield (a world of isolation-
ism, power blocks and protectionism), forum 
(a world of growing consensus and coopera-
tive international structures with a strong role 
for public administrations and intervention) 
and hypermarket (a world where the market 
rules and liberalization and privatization de-
liver results) were contrasted with the tradi-
tional economic view denoted by the con-
ventional wisdom scenario (CEC, 1995). 
[73] Despite the different assumptions, all scenarios 
predicted a continued steady growth in world 
energy demand (around 2% per annum on 
average). In the EU decreasing energy intensity 
keeps growth in energy demand to between 
0.7-0.9% per year, with natural gas consump-
tion growing fastest, oil growing slowly, and 
coal and nuclear consumption declining. Al-
though oil is likely to continue to account for 
the largest proportion of world energy demand 
its growth rate is below that of gas which is 
predicted to grow at up to 2.7% per annum, 
with both environmental and commercial ad-
vantages. Renewable energy is expected to 
grow at around 2% per year or more, while 
nuclear energy declines, its advantages in 
terms of C0 2 emissions outweighed by safety 
concerns. 
[74] EU production of non-renewable energy (i.e. 
fossil fuels) is predicted to decline by about 
20% by 2020 and so import dependency 
rises from current levels of 48% to between 
55 and 70%. The predictions are relatively 
optimistic about the growth in renewables 
which increase threefold under the conven-
tional wisdom scenario and could grow at 
almost 5% in the forum scenario. Despite 
this only the forum scenario resulted in 
reduced C0 2 emissions over the long term 
(due to a major shift to renewables and 
nuclear), with all the others showing substan-
tial increases over 1990 levels in both the 
EU and the world as a whole. 
[75] The above scenarios and predictions raise 
some important points. All organizations pre-
dict very substantial increases in energy con-
sumption, around 50% by 2020 unless radical 
changes occur. All see energy consumption in 
the EU as growing at a slower rate than almost 
anywhere else in the world, but per capita 
consumption remaining very high despite in-
creases in energy efficiency. The transport 
sector is the major single contributor to incre-
mental growth in final energy demand and 
C 0 2 emissions (CEC, 1995). It is clear that that 
C 0 2 emissions will continue to increase unless 
there are serious changes in energy supply and 
demand. 
[76] Several groups have analysed what would be 
required to reduce C0 2 emissions to below 
1990 levels and meet their vision of sustain-
able energy production and use. Greenpeace 
commissioned the Stockholm Environmental 
Institute to develop an energy scenario 
which would meet long-term targets for 
phasing out nuclear energy by 2010 and 
fossil fuels by 2100. In this scenario about 
28% of primary energy consumption would 
be based on renewables by 2010 and 60% 
by 2030, cutting C0 2 emissions by about 
50% by 2020 and reducing them to zero by 
2100. To achieve this would require an 
increase in the amount of gas used in the 
short term and a massive development of 
biomass, solar, hydrogen and hydro-powered 
energy systems. 
[77] The Friends of the Earth 'Towards a sustain-
able Europe' study considers the most impor-
tant energy-related problem to be its contri-
bution to the greenhouse effect and to quan-
tify the environmental space accordingly. 
They calculate that to meet IPCC targets, 
maximum per capita C0 2 emissions should 
be 2 tonnes per year which would have to 
be reduced to 1.7 tonnes per year by 2050 
to take population increases into account. 
Current annual global per capita C0 2 emis-
sions are about 4 tonnes and the average for 
Europe is 7.3 tonnes. Friends of the Earth 
consider the feasibility of the uptake of re-
newable resources envisaged in the Green-
peace scenarios to be overestimated and 
suggest that greater improvements in energy 
use could reduce the magnitude of renewa-
bles required. 
3.3.4. Agriculture and rural 
development 
Trends 
[78] Global food output has been increasing at 
an average rate of 2.3% per year over the 
last 20 years. In Europe, as in many other 
parts of the world, farmers have been re-
markably successful at increasing food pro-
duction. In the UK, wheat yields have in-
creased from an average of 2.1 t/ha to 
7 t/ha and milk yields from about 11 pints 
per day to 25 pints per day per cow (Pretty 
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and Howes, 1993). However, around 800 
million people are undernourished today 
and the Food and Agriculture Organization 
predict the global annual growth in food 
output will decrease to 1.8% per year, 
although this will still be above the rate of 
population growth (FAO, 1993). 
[79] Agriculture currently accounts for 2.5% of 
European Union GDP and employs 6% of the 
workforce. It plays a much larger role in the 
Central and Eastern European countries which 
are likely to join the EU in the near future, 
where it accounts for 8% of GDP and employs 
25% of the workforce (CEC, 1995b). Many of 
these countries also have serious agricultural 
related environmental problems. The common 
agricultural policy of the European Union 
which was conceived initially for six Member 
States in a general food deficit situation has 
become increasingly complicated, expensive 
and controversial, accounting for over half the 
total EU budget and leading to major produc-
tion surpluses (WWF, 1996). Another major 
criticism is that its original form did not take 
the environment, nature or landscape into 
account and efforts to introduce environmen-
tal initiatives subsequently have led to con-
flicting instruments and incentives. In 1992, 
the Mac Sharry reforms were introduced, 
which began to de-link payments from pro-
duction levels and it is likely that this trend will 
continue. 
Concerns and issues 
[80] Can global food output feed the population in 
the year 2020? There are very divergent views 
as to whether or not this ispossible, depending 
on the assumptions that are made about popu-
lation (for example Winrock International pre-
dict that the population will reach 7.8 billion 
by 2035 and then decrease, whilst the 'State of 
the world population' report estimates that the 
number of people in the world could reach 
12.5 billion by 2050), environmental degrada-
tion, technological advances and the extent of 
potential yield increases with low and high use 
of external inputs. 
[81 ] What is sustainable agriculture? Views on this 
range from those who believe agriculture can 
only be sustainable if it is entirely organic or 
that sustainable agriculture is low input agri-
culture suited to local conditions, through to 
those who believe that agriculture will only be 
sustainable if high external inputs and biotech-
nology are used in order to meet growing 
global demand (see box). 
Box 8 — What is sustainable agriculture? 
Five schools of thought 
'Environmental pessimists' 
The world is approaching or has passed the 
ecological limits to growth. Populations are too 
high,' yield growth has slowed and will continue 
to slow and may fall, new technological break-
throughs are unlikely and large areas have be-
come too degraded for recovery, dietary shifts 
towards increasing consumption of meat are an 
emerging threat since this increases the amount of 
cereal required. Hence if the world is to be able 
to feed itself, population control should be the 
first priority (see Brown, 1994, CGIAR, 1994, 
Kendall and Pimentel, 1994, Brown and Kane, 
1994, Ehrlich, 1968). 
'Business as usual optimists' 
Supply will always be able to meet increasing 
demand through innovations in biotechnology and 
an expansion in the area of land under cultiva-
tion. Population growth will slow and the South 
will substantially increase food imports from the 
North (see Rosegrant and Agacaolli, 1994, Mitch-
ell and Ingco, 1993, FAO, 1993, Crosson and 
Anderson 1995). 
'Industrialized world to the rescue' 
Most countries in the South will never be able 
to feed themselves for a variety of ecological, 
institutional and infrastructural reasons and so the 
looming food gap will have to be filled by 
modernized agriculture in the North. By increas-
ing production in large mechanized operations, 
this will allow smaller and more 'marginal' farm-
ers to go out of business, so taking pressure off 
natural resources which can be conserved in 
protected areas. These large producers will then 
be able to trade their food with those who need 
it, or have it distributed by famine relief and 
food aid. Any adverse health and environmental 
consequences of this type of farming is minor 
compared to that wrought by the expansion into 
new lands (see Avery, 1995, Wirth, 1995, Dow 
Elanco, 1994, Carruthers, 1993, Knutson, et al. 
1990). 
'New modernists' 
Yield increases can be achieved through high-
external input farming i.e. increased use of ferti-
lisers and pesticides, either on existing 'Green 
revolution' land or on other high potential areas 
which will keep the pressure off natural habitats. 
High inputs are essential if increases in output are 
to be achieved (see Borlaug, 1992, 1994, Sasa-
kawa Global 2000, 1994, World Bank, 1994, 
Waggoner, 1994, Paarlberg, 1994, Winrock Inter-
national, 1994, Crosson and Anderson, 1995). 
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'Sustainable intensification' 
Increases in yield and protection or regeneration 
of natural resources are possible in currently 
unimproved or degraded areas through low input 
agriculture which integrates a wide range of pest, 
nutrient and soil and water management tech-
niques, so long as farmers participate in all stages 
of technological development and extension since 
productivity is as much a function of human 
capacity and ingenuity as it is of biological proc-
esses. It aims for an increased diversity of enter-
prises as natural processes increasingly substitute 
for external inputs so the impact on the environ-
ment is reduced (see Pretty, 1995, Thompson, 
1995, Roling and Wagemakers, 1996). 
[82] The role of European agriculture in a global 
market. Should the focus be on farming in a 
way that meets local needs and plays a key 
role in the community or is it essential that 
Europe produces surpluses in order to feed 
those parts of the world which have food 
deficits? Should all subsidies be removed so 
that European prices are reduced to world 
market levels or not? 
[83] The extent to which the social and environ-
mental role of agriculture should be consid-
ered. While some view agriculture as just 
another economic sector, others see it as a key 
to rural development, local communities and 
the management of the countryside. 
[84] How to reform the CAP. There is little disa-
greement about the need to reform the CAP 
but there are widely divergent views on how 
this should be done. These range from remov-
ing all payments to make EU agriculture com-
petitive on the world market even if this results 
in many farms going out of business, to the 
view that payments for social and environ-
mental benefits should be vastly increased. 
Bpx 9 — Consultative Forum — Recom-
mendations for sustainable rural develop-
ment 
• Agriculture must be economically viable over the 
long term; 
• Sustainability should be achieved through interac-
tion of environmental, agricultural, transport, en-
ergy and consumption policies; 
• The basic obligations of agriculture towards the 
environment must be negotiated and clearly deter-
mined; 
• Additional environmental services provided by 
agriculture must be enforced and developed on 
identified economic resources; 
• European policy must show clear and consistent 
signals to agriculture; 
• European policy should offer possibilities of evo-
lution for farming systems. 
3.3.5. Consumption and production 
patterns 
[85] It was the June 1992 Earth Summit which 
placed consumption once again onto the in-
ternational environment and development 
policy agenda. Growing out of increasing 
'green consumer' concerns, research and ne-
gotiations leading up to the Rio Summit re-
sulted in the judgment contained in the 
Agenda 21 action plan that 'the major cause of 
the continued deterioration of the global envi-
ronment is the unsustainable pattern of con-
sumption and. production, particularly in in-
dustrialized countries, aggravating poverty 
and imbalances' (UNCED, 1992). The Earth 
Summit highlighted the deep divisions in con-
sumption and pollution between North and 
South, whereby the 20% of the world's popu-
lation in the rich 'North' account for 50-90% 
of consumption and pollution. The disparity 
between benchmark countries such as the 
USA and India is even more extreme: the 
average US citizen consumes 227 times as 
much gasoline and 115 times as much paper 
as the average Indian (Parikh, et al., 1991). 
Developed countries were called upon to take 
the lead in achieving sustainable consump-
tion.1 
[86] Since the Earth Summit, governments, busi-
nesses, environmental organizations and re-
search institutes have worked at the interna-
tional level to develop a shared understanding 
of what is required to achieve sustainable 
consumption. The 1994 Oslo Symposium 
hosted by Norway's Ministry of the Environ-
ment produced a working definition of sustain-
able consumption as: 'the use of services and 
related products which respond to basic needs 
and bring a better quality of life while mini-
mizing the use of natural resources and toxic 
materials as well as the emissions of waste and 
pollutants over the life cycle of the service or 
product so as not to jeopardise the needs of 
future generations' (Oslo I, 1994). 
[87] Two broad visions of sustainable consumption 
have emerged to make this definition opera-
tional: eco-efficiency and eco-sufficiency. 
[88] i. Eco-efficiency: more with less. At the Earth 
Summit, the business community launched the 
1 Sustainable consumption has been defined as 'the use of 
services and related products which respond to basic needs 
and bring better quality of life while minimizing the uses of 
natural resources and toxic materials as well as the emissions 
of waste and pollutants over the life cycle of the service or 
products so as not to jeopardize the needs of future genera-
tions'. Two broad visions of sustainable consumption have 
emerged to make this definition operational. 
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concept of eco-efficiency, which the BCSD 
defined as: 'continuously adding value to 
products and services, while constantly reduc-
ing energy and material use, pollution and 
waste' (Schmidheiny, 1992). This drew on the 
historical record of market economies to con-
tinuously reduce the resources used for each 
unit of economic output (WCED, 1987). The 
aim of eco-efficiency is to accelerate this 
process, by encouraging companies to seek 
out ways of providing the services that custom-
ers demand with reduced resource use and 
pollution (BCSD, 1993). 
[89] Leading business commentators and corpora-
tions are now arguing that achieving more 
value for consumers with less environmental 
impact translates into economic success (Por-
ter and van der Linde, 1995; Hindle, et al., 
1993). Products are being rethought according 
to new 'design for the environment' (ecode-
sign) criteria. Dow Europe has identified six 
main dimensions: de-materialization; energy 
efficiency; toxic elimination; closed loop recy-
cling; borrowing from natural cycles; and ex-
tending service life (Fussier, 1995). Eco-effi-
ciency has also been endorsed by the Environ-
ment Ministers of the OECD as 'a highly 
promising strategy to de-couple pollutant re-
lease and resource use from economic activ-
ity' (OECD 1996c). 
[90] The eco-efficiency strategy does, however, 
contain risks. Continuing growth in consump-
tion can overwhelm the benefits of eco-effi-
ciency, as the energy and transport sectors 
demonstrate. Thus, despite the 20% energy 
efficiency improvement in the OECD over the 
last two decades, total energy consumption 
rose by a quarter and carbon dioxide emis-
sions grew by 15% (OECD, 1991). Existing 
economies of scale and inherited infrastruc-
ture can also create inertia that restrain the 
diffusion of cleaner and more efficient patterns 
of consumption. 
[91] Two strands of eco-efficiency thinking have 
now emerged. The 'pragmatic' version of eco-
efficiency supports an incremental approach 
whereby improvements are only made where 
they make market sense. However, there is 
also a 'radical' definition which defines the 
rate of improvement according to targets 
based on an assessment of the ecological and 
social limits within which future economic 
activity wil l have to operate. An example of 
this strand of thinking is the establishment of 
the Factor 10 Club of academics, policy-mak-
ers and business executives, who have con-
cluded that 'in industrialized countries, the 
current resource productivity must be in-
creased by a factor of 10 during the next 30 to 
50 years as a prerequisite for meeting the goal 
of long-term global sustainability' (Factor 10 
Club,1994). 
[92] ¡i. Eco-sufficiency: enough for all. Through-
out history, consumption patterns have been 
subject to ethical critique, usually sanc-
tioned by religious injunctions to control the 
use of certain materials, foods, drinks or 
luxury practices. In the secular consumer 
economies of North America, Europe and 
East Asia, concern for the environment has 
largely replaced religion as the principal 
ethical response to consumption. Indeed 
Elizabeth Dowdeswell, Executive Director of 
UNEP has argued that 'ultimately, sustain-
able consumption is not a scientific or a 
technical question. It really is first and fore-
most a question of values'. 
[93] Although there is now much greater opti-
mism about the possibility of an eco-effi-
ciency strategy to reduce environmental im-
pacts, concern remains that this wil l be 
inadequate to achieve sustainability, requir-
ing a shift towards 'a culture of having 
enough' (Van Brakel, 1995). While the eco-
efficiency strategy is aimed at 'getting the 
same services out of less material', the 
complementary eco-sufficiency strategy is 
geared at 'getting the same (or at least 
adequate) welfare out of less services', in-
cluding through an appreciation of simpler 
lifestyles (Sachs, 1993). This approach re-
flects the evidence of public opinion sur-
veys in the industrialized world of unease 
with the social and environmental conse-
quences of current consumption patterns. A 
1995 survey of American views on con-
sumption, materialism and the environment 
found 'an intuitive sense that our propensity 
for more, more, more is unsustainable' 
(Merck, 1995). 
[94] While many earlier proponents of the eco-
sufficiency model emphasized the aspect of 
sacrifice in terms of 'giving up' valued parts of 
modern lifestyles, the current emphasis is on 
stressing the positive aspects of achieving a 
better quality of life, less dependent on mate-
rial consumption (ANPED, 1995). The role of 
designers is expanded from the functional 
focus on efficiency to include the creation of 
products offering opportunities for new types 
of consumer behaviour, which place a pre-
mium on care in place of disposability (Man-
zini, 1993). Some argue that a 'need test' 
addressing this sufficiency agenda should be 
introduced to complement the traditional, 
more environmentally-driven business ap-
proach to sustainable consumption (Sustain-
ability, 1995). The flip-side of this ethical 
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search in industrialized countries for a 'culture 
of enough' from a position of abundance is the 
imperative in the developing world of meeting 
the basic needs of those who continue to live 
in poverty. 
[95] Since Rio, this vision of eco-sufficiency has 
been powerfully underpinned by range of sce-
narios built on the concept of 'environmental 
space', mentioned previously. The concept is 
based on two main principles: first, an assess-
ment that the global environment is by defini-
tion limited and partially quantifiable (the 
principle of limits); and second, that this 'en-
vironmental space' should be shared fairly 
among the countries of the world on an equal 
per capita basis (the principle of equity). Start-
ing in the Netherlands, the Friends of the Earth 
family in Europe has organized a sustainable 
Europe campaign, in which environmental 
space is used as the basis for drawing up 30 
national sustainability plans (Milieudefensie, 
1992; FOEE, 1995). The eco-space approach 
has since been picked up by a number of 
European environment ministries, notably in 
Denmark and the Netherlands, as a framework 
for strategic policy-making (VROM, 1994; 
MEE, 1995). 
[96] The eco-sufficiency vision also has weak-
nesses. It relies on the assertion of certain 
normative values, which are both difficult to 
universalize in pluralist democratic societies, 
or to use as a basis for trade-off. Interpretations 
of equity and fairness in the distribution of 
goods are deeply political issues, with wide 
divergence between those'arguing for egalitar-
ian solutions and those believing that market 
outcomes are just. 
Box 10 — The Consultative Forum's con-
clusions on consumption and production 
patterns 
The Consultative Forum has recommended that the 
EU should play a leadership role in addressing this 
global problem. At home it should set a good exam-
ple by encouraging the de-coupling of resource use 
from continued economic growth and then, as a 
further step, encourage a reduction in absolute terms. 
Externally it should assist the developing countries in 
the difficult task to stabilize their impact on the 
environment while still achieving their economic 
growth aspirations. The Forum believes there is wide 
scope for technology cooperation, sharing best prac-
tice and joint implementation. 
To achieve these goals a process of target setting is 
required which consists of two elements: 
1. Scientific research: Deliver scientific information 
about carrying capacity and environmental 
space; 
2. Political process: Choose targets, measurable in-
dicators and related time-frames connected to 
those mechanisms should be chosen. 
The Forum identified nine important principles 
for sustainable production and six principles for 
sustainable consumption. It concluded that the 
responsibility of policy-makers include: clear tar-
gets; involvement of all partners; basic research; 
priority to information, and choosing the right 
instruments (see Section 4.3.3.). 
3.3.6. The urban environment 
[97] More than 50% of the world's population 
will live in urban areas by the end of the 
century, and 60% by 2020. Cities are centres 
of economic activity and innovation, as well 
as politics and culture. But they also ulti-
mately consume most of the natural re-
sources and produce most of the world's 
pollution and waste (WRI, 1996). Europe is 
first and foremost an urban region. On aver-
age, more than two-thirds of European Union 
citizens live in urban areas, and this propor-
tion continues to increase. In some Member 
States, as much as 90% of the population are 
urban (SCP, 1994). 
[98] Cities produce a number of direct environ-
mental problems, notably air pollution, noise, 
traffic congestion, solid waste and water efflu-
ents. In many European cities, there are unac-
ceptable short-term peak levels of ozone dur-
ing summer (EEA, 1995a). In large cities, the 
proportion of the population exposed to unac-
ceptable levels of noise is two to three times 
higher than the national average (EEA, 1995b). 
Through their consumption and production 
patterns, Europe's cities also make a range of 
'ecological footprints' in the form of resource 
extraction and the generation of pollution 
(Rees, 1992). 
[99] Although each city is to some extent 
unique, the European urban system has a 
number of characteristics which distinguish 
it from other regions, notably the expansive 
urbanization of North America and the 
rapid growth in Asia. However, Europe also 
suffers from a form of 'schizophrenia' be-
tween its high density, public transport inner 
cities and the low-density private car pe-
ripheries. Looking ahead, the challenges for 
Europe's cities are linked to 'the urgency to 
recreate a dynamic harmony between the 
hardware and the software of cities, to 
reconcile the body (forms, colours, odours, 
sounds) and the soul (culture, history, en-
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ergy, magnetism)' (MEGA, 1996). Another 
theme is rethinking the 'urban metabolism' 
to reduce the throughput of resources and 
increase the welfare generated. 
[100] The urban environment is now recognized as 
a crucial arena for future progress towards 
sustainability in Europe, particularly where 
the Rio principles of equity, partnership and 
participation can become real. Globally, the 
Earth Summit has stimulated the introduction 
across Europe of 'Local Agenda 21s', partici-
patory plans designed to project how particu-
lar communities can contribute to sustain-
able development. In Europe, this was taken 
forward with the launch of the 'European 
campaign of sustainable cities and towns' in 
1994; by November 1995, 177 cities had 
joined the campaign. 
[101 ] Towns and city neighbourhoods are moving 
beyond simple environmental improvement 
measures to becoming 'laboratories for eco-
logical innovation' (MEGA, 1996). Freiburg 
(194 000 inhabitants) in Germany has moved 
towards a car free city, aiming to cut car use 
from 50 to 33% through high parking tariffs, 
fewer parking places and investment in public 
transport. Branau (17 000 inhabitants) in Aus-
tria is aiming to maintain low-waste lifestyles 
among its inhabitants: it still has no fast-food 
restaurant, and is using planning permits to 
continue without one. Bergen (220 000) in 
Norway has set up an educational project to 
raise awareness on climate change, by issuing 
schoolchildren with 'C02 ration books', 
which give personal quotas according to 'en-
vironmental space' (T&D, 1995). 
3.3.7. Broadening the range 
of instruments 
[102] The Consultative Forum has stated that a 
broadening of the range of instruments for 
achieving sustainable development is re-
quired. Environmental policy instruments 
should be: ecologically efficient, economi-
cally efficient, practicable, and equitable. 
The Forum has made the following conclu-
sions: 
• There is a need for a strategic approach to imple-
menting the EU policy 'Towards sustainability'; 
• Policy instruments should be developed to 
achieve environmental goals and targets in the 
most cost-effective way; 
• A broader range of instruments, including stand-
ards/regulations, economic instruments and vol-
untary initiatives can play a wider role in the 
EU; 
• There is insufficient cost/benefit analysis in defin-
ing best practicable options; 
• There needs to be transparent and open consul-
tation process between government, industry and 
the public; 
• The Commission should undertake a comprehen-
sive but prioritized review of the cost-effective-
ness of the current range of policy instruments for 
which cost-effectiveness is claimed; 
• Best practice among the Member States in imple-
menting innovative and cost-effective policy in-
struments should be shared. 
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